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ARTICLES
PROCESSING DISABILITY
JASMINE E. HARRIS*
This Article argues that the practice of holding so many adjudicative
proceedings related to disability in private settings (e.g., guardianship, special
education due process, civil commitment, and social security) relative to our
strong normative presumption of public access to adjudication may cultivate
and perpetuate stigma in contravention of the goals of inclusion and
enhanced agency set forth in antidiscrimination laws. Descriptively, the law
has a complicated history with disability—initially rendering disability
invisible; later, underwriting particular narratives of disability synonymous
with incapacity; and, in recent history, promoting the full socio-economic
visibility of people with disabilities. The Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), the marquee civil rights legislation for people with disabilities (about to
enter its twenty-fifth year), expresses a national approach to disability that
recognizes the role of society in its construction, maintenance, and potential
remedy. However, the ADA’s mission is incomplete. It has not generated the
types of interactions between people with disabilities and nondisabled people
empirically shown to deconstruct deeply entrenched social stigma.
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Prescriptively, procedural design can act as an “antistigma agent” to resist
and mitigate disability stigma. This Article focuses on one element of
institutional design—public access to adjudication—as a potential tool to
construct and disseminate counter-narratives of disability. The unique
substantive focus in disability adjudication on questions of agency provides a
potential public space for the negotiation of nuanced definitions of disability
and capacity more reflective of the human condition.
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INTRODUCTION
The current scholarly concerns regarding shifts towards greater
privacy in and privatization of adjudication as counter-normative—
particularly in the civil rights context—omit a key historical exception
to presumptions of public adjudication.1 Disability adjudication has
unfolded almost exclusively in private settings as an untested norm in
the parens patriae tradition of the state as “protector” of vulnerable
populations. In fact, while such a move has generated much debate
and controversy in areas such as national security, immigration,2 tort,
and business litigation, presumptions of closed, less formal adjudicative
proceedings in the disability context remain unexplored by legal
scholars. Even political philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who fervently
advanced the “publicity” values of open adjudicative proceedings as
fundamental to liberal democracies, carved out exceptions for disability
on the basis of its presumed vulnerability and stigma.3
What is the relationship between privacy (or publicity) and
disability stigma? How do we reconcile antidiscrimination laws such
as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that seek to maximize
the agency and dignity of people with disabilities4 as full socioeconomic participants with presumptions of disability as a private,
stigmatizing matter and, thus, in need of protection from disclosure?5
What is the role of law in the creation and remedy of disability stigma?

1. See Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1802 (2014) [hereinafter
Resnik, Privatization of Process] (emphasizing the demise of public values of
adjudication with the shift to less formal adjudication); see also Judith Resnik, Bring
Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and Public Sphere(s), 5 LAW & ETHICS
HUM. RTS. 1, 4–5 (2011) [hereinafter Resnik, Bring Back Bentham] (arguing that
privatization of judicial claims has removed the visibility of human rights claims
from public oversight).
2. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Hafetz, The First Amendment and the Right of Access to
Deportation Proceedings, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 265, 265–66, 268 (2004) (discussing closed
proceedings in the immigration context as violative of the First Amendment right of
public access to adjudication).
3. See PHILIP SCHOFIELD, UTILITY AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 256–57 (2006) (chronicling popular discourse of Jeremy Bentham).
4. Note that this Article uses “people first” language consistent with the view
within the U.S. disability rights movement that disabilities and medical diagnoses are
not persons and do not define individuals.
5. This Article focuses on the relationship between private adjudication and
disability stigma. In a later project, I will examine the normative implications of the
history of closed proceedings in the disability context and what lessons it offers to
proceduralists more broadly who think about the “privatization of process.”
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This Article argues that the more law treats disability as a private
matter, the more disability (and social stigma) it may construct.6
Historically, laws have shifted pendulously from explicit protection of
the public from looking at and interacting with people with disabilities—for
example, public vagrancy laws7—to laws designed to protect disability
from public disclosure—for example, laws protecting medical and
health information8—with the same outcome of hindering the
circulation of information about and experiences with disability.
Current normative conceptions of disability suffer from a certain
informational poverty—that is, the public has had limited access to
diverse, disaggregated narratives of disability obtained through social
contact and the media.
Consequently, selective narratives of
disability (all with fundamental questions of agency at their core)—
the heroic person who achieves success and happiness in spite of
disability, the dangerous criminal with a mental disability, the pitiable
invalid—dominate public discourse.
The ADA, now approaching its twenty-fifth anniversary, sought to
address discrimination through greater integration of people with
disabilities into society, in part, by increasing their visibility in public
spaces. Congress identified stigma, “prejudice, [and] antiquated
attitudes” as the primary impediments to full inclusion driving the
6. SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS
DISABILITY 40 (1996); see also MATTHEW W. BRAULT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2010 4 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2012pubs/p70-131.pdf (stating that approximately one in five of the civilian
non-institutionalized population, or 56.7 million people, has a disability). This
Article refers to “disability” in its singular form to reflect a theory or philosophy of
the construction. However, part of the goal of this Article is to surface the tension
between laws’ categorical and essentialist nature and function and the plurality of
lived experiences that fall within an umbrella concept such as “disability.”
Disabilities vary in the age of onset, visibility, and/or whether the disability is
progressive (e.g., muscular dystrophy). These factors interact to determine a
person’s conception of disability as part of identity and her social identity and lived
experience as a person with a disability. See MICHELLE FINE & ADRIENNE ASCH, WOMEN
WITH DISABILITIES: ESSAYS IN PSYCHOLOGY, CULTURE, AND POLITICS 1 (1988) (discussing
intersectionality of disability with gender, race, ethnicity, and class).
7. See, e.g., SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN PUBLIC 3–5 (2009)
(discussing municipal public conduct codes structured to protect the public from the
visible impact of disability and difference: “[d]isability disturbs” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also infra Part I.A (describing the historical concealment of
disability through so called “ugly laws,” or ordinances which prohibited people with
disabilities from appearing in public and labeled disability a public nuisance).
8. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 10491, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 29,
42 U.S.C.).
ON
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promulgation of the ADA.9 However, while the ADA relatively
increased the visibility of people with disabilities in society through
greater access to public accommodations and protections against
employment discrimination (primarily for those who were already in
the formal employment sector), structural discrimination persists.
The ADA has not generated the type of social interaction and public
discourse necessary to shape and disseminate counter-narratives of
disability and deconstruct stigma according to social science stigma
research.
People with disabilities continue to be un- and
underemployed10 and under-educated11 on the basis of false
conceptions of their agency and humanity. The persistence of social
stigmas of disability warrants a deeper exploration of the role of law
in its construction, perpetuation, and potential remedial landscape.
Critical analysis of institutional designs in disability adjudication
offers unexplored opportunities to reduce self- and public stigmas of
disability. While shortcomings may exist within the classic adversarial
process in either a court or administrative proceeding, such fora
allow for public confrontation with state actors.12
As such,
adjudicative proceedings can be performative sites of liberal
democracies where civil societies engage in public discourse about
events and issues of extraordinary importance in their ordinary
lives.13 This Article focuses on one element of institutional design—
9. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)).
10. See, e.g., Table A. Employment Status of the Civilian Population by Sex, Age, and
Disability Status, Not Seasonally Adjusted, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://data.bls.gov/
cgi-bin/print.pl/news.release/empsit.t06.htm (last updated Jan. 9, 2015) (publishing
the December 2014 rate of job market participation for people with disabilities at
20.3%, compared to approximately 70% of the nondisabled population, and the
unemployment rate decreasing at approximately 11% for people with disabilities and
at approximately 5.1% for nondisabled people, half the rate for people with disabilities).
11. See, e.g., MARIE C. STETSER & ROBERT STILLWELL, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL FOUR-YEAR ON-TIME
GRADUATION RATES AND EVENT DROPOUT RATES: SCHOOL YEARS 2010–11 AND 2011–12
4, 9–10 tbl.2 (2014) (finding that while national graduation rates average 80% for
nondisabled students, the national average for students with disabilities was only 61%
in the 2011–2012 school year with significant disparities across individual states
ranging from 24% to 81%).
12. See Resnik, Bring Back Bentham, supra note 1, at 6 (“Through public processes, one
learns whether individuals of all kinds—including ‘suspected terrorists’—are understood
to be persons equally entitled to the forms of procedure offered to others, so as to
mark their dignity and to accord them the respect and fairness due to all persons.”).
13. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 4–5 (Thomas Burger &
Frederick Lawrence trans. 1989) (recounting historical and theoretical
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public access to adjudication—while recognizing the potential for
other procedural designs—e.g., access to counsel, evidentiary rules—
to advance agency of disputants with disabilities.
Disability law is unique in the existence of adjudicative proceedings
that directly implicate the agency and dignity of people with
disabilities. These proceedings interpret and apply the integrative
goals of disability laws to the everyday lives of people with disabilities
at critical moments when questions arise about their ability to live
and work in the most inclusive socio-economic settings. I advance
novel descriptive and evaluative claims. To begin with, a startling
number of hearings related to disability occur in nonpublic settings
counter to broader historical presumptions of open courts—e.g.,
guardianship and civil commitment hearings. These procedural
designs—intentionally or by default—may cultivate and perpetuate
stigma unnecessarily in contravention of the goals of inclusion,
individual dignity, and enhanced agency set forth in the ADA. I
argue that a more critical, nuanced analysis of disability proceedings
can create opportunities to challenge the roots of disability stigma—
namely, categorical presumptions of disability as incapacity—in at
least two ways. First, it allows for greater participation by some people
with disabilities in the adjudicatory process itself. Second, it reframes
concepts of both disability and agency as flexible, social constructions
that exist on a continuum rather than rigid, medical diagnoses.14
Accordingly, this Article brings together scholarly discussions in at
least three areas—civil rights, procedure, and disability—to move
beyond antidiscrimination laws as the sole prescription for social

underpinnings behind the development and significance of a public sphere of
discourse); see also Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the
Critique of Actually Existing Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 109, 109–11
(Craig Calhoun ed., 1992) (expanding Jürgen Habermas’s notion of “public sphere”
to account for feminist political theories).
14. This view of disability as “a natural part of the human condition” first
appeared in a 1985 report from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Scholars since
that time have drawn upon this concept in disability and feminist legal theory to
construct a mutual “vulnerability” that defines the human experience. See, e.g.,
Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 19–20 (2008) (urging a paradigmatic shift in
conceptualizing the power of the state to empower those who are vulnerable); Ani B.
Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513,
523 (2008) (agreeing with Fineman’s theory of vulnerability and arguing that society
has a discriminatory vulnerability towards people with disabilities).
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inequality.15 Civil rights scholars wrestle with the limitations of classic
antidiscrimination
paradigms
to
address
implicit
bias.16
Proceduralists think about the identification and implementation of
underlying values of procedure—including agency and dignity—
through the construction and manipulation of adjudicative rules and
standards.17 Finally, and perhaps most directly, I join the current
discussion among disability scholars seeking new interpretive and
remedial frameworks for disability discrimination within existing civil
rights laws and jurisprudence.18 Sam Bagenstos, for example, argues
persuasively that the “future of disability law” lies not in
antidiscrimination efforts per se but, rather, in a return to social
welfare laws to provide economic supports—such as funding for
assistive technology—that will make integration possible.19 Most
15. It also adds to the scholarly discussion among behavioral change theorists
regarding the role of the law more broadly in changing social norms by positioning
stigma reduction front and center as an explicit indicator of normative change. See
Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 39 (2002)
(pointing to rules against smoking in public places as an example of placing norms
front and center in legal requirements to effectuate a change in stigma); Dan M.
Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 607, 644–45 (2000) (concluding that lawmakers are reluctant to force changes
in social norms through legislation and enforcement); Lawrence Lessig, Social
Meanings and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181, 2186 (1996) (acknowledging a
cost or price valuation in normative behaviors and hinting at the effect of shifting
such economic factors when changing norms and meanings through the law). This
Article, however, leaves open questions of precise empirical measurement of stigma
reduction, which social scientists continue to shape and explore. See, e.g., Patrick J.
Michaels et al., Changing Stigma Through a Consumer-Based Stigma Reduction Program, 50
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 395, 395, 399 (2014) (measuring stigma reduction
efforts in the mental health context).
16. See, e.g., Lisa C. Ikemoto, Racial Disparities in Health Care and Cultural
Competency, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 75, 75–76 (2003) (highlighting language
inaccessibility as a form of implicit bias and the need to expand antidiscrimination
remedies to address bias in health disparities); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark:
Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 804 (2004) (considering
the limits of antidiscrimination paradigms to address implicit biases and stigma).
17. See ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 2–7
(1979) (discussing underlying values of procedure); see also Resnik, Privatization of
Process, supra note 1, at 1802 (arguing that the promotion of alternative dispute
resolution enhances first-hand knowledge of the claims made and provides
opportunities to bring claims affordably).
18. The move beyond antidiscrimination is not unique to disability law scholars.
See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 261
(2000) (explaining the concept of “therapeutic jurisprudence”); Kenji Yoshino, The
New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 747–48 (2011) (framing the shift beyond
equality jurisprudence as a product of greater “pluralism anxiety”).
19. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 54–56 (2004).
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recently, Elizabeth Emens proposes informational “[f]raming rules”
as a way to shift public attitudes of disability at key moments when
nondisabled people personally encounter a decision that implicates a
future relationship with disability.20 Her thesis, much like the present
thesis, turns on the provision of information to nondisabled people
about the lived experiences of people with disabilities to shift the
stereotypical views of disability that dominate mainstream society.
This Article, however, is the first to examine the potential of
procedural mechanisms to mitigate stigmas of disability by focusing
on the performance of disability and its dissemination of counternarratives in public adjudicative spaces.
I proceed in four parts following this introduction. Part I advances
the claim that as a historical matter, the law rendered disability
invisible. I contend that the history of systematic concealment of
disability as an identity (irrespective of malicious or benevolent
motives) generated three narrow and deleterious narratives of
disability—deviance, incapacity, and separate but unequal—that
persist today as common heuristics to understand people with
disabilities. I offer three examples—respectively, public vagrancy
laws, institutionalization, and segregated education—to illustrate the
foundations of these narratives. Exploring their origins, evolution,
and authorship sheds light on appropriate prescriptions.
Part II spotlights the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress’s
remedial response to the socio-economic invisibility set forth in Part I. I
discuss congressional intent and design and submit a distinct assessment
of the ADA’s success in responding to the history of invisibility.21 The
ADA, while expressive of important ideological shifts from “disability” as
individual deficits to a national recognition of its social constructions,
has not engendered the visibility and contact necessary to challenge
deeply entrenched disability stigma. I argue that, although Congress
recognized the importance of addressing social stigma, the remedial
design of the ADA could not reach the root of disability stigma—that is,
the cognitive-affective associations of disability with incapacity and
inhumanity. I draw upon social science to explain why stigma is so
formidable and ubiquitous and call for well-designed interventions to
reduce its effects. If we understand stigmatization as a process of

20. Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383, 1410–34
(2012) [hereinafter Emens, Framing Disability].
21. Most evaluative projects concern the economic impact of the ADA. See infra
Part II.A–B (asserting that the ADA has not been as successful as intended in
increasing the socio-economic visibility of people with disabilities).

HARRIS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

PROCESSING DISABILITY

4/20/2015 8:00 PM

465

mismanaging social differences (perceived or actual), then reframing
stigma in process terms respects its social constructions and can help
reverse engineer its formation to reduce stigma.
Part III advances the role of procedural law in mitigating disability
stigma. Whereas the prior Parts concern the law’s historical role in
rendering disability invisible and shaping social stigma, this Part asks
whether the law can instead be a means to promote visibility and to
circulate counter-narratives of disability in public places. We may miss
significant opportunities to destigmatize disability (and may, in fact, be
exacerbating it) by ignoring the functional and expressive values
underlying adjudicative procedures and rules.
Attention to
institutional design—specifically, what I call “antistigma agency”—can
enter and navigate spaces that antidiscrimination laws cannot and,
consequently, can open the discursive space to shape a broader
disability consciousness.22 I focus on public access to adjudication as a
space traditionally recognized for its ability to ignite public awareness.
Finally, Part IV confronts potential objections to openness as one
possible procedural remedy to advance antistigma agency.
I.

VESTIGES OF INVISIBILITY

Despite advances in the visibility of people with disabilities in public
spaces generated by the Americans with Disabilities Act, remnants of the
early socio-legal invisibility—specifically, the historical constructs and
narratives of disability as categorical incapacity and shame—remain.23
This section addresses the law’s production of what Linda Hamilton
Krieger calls “core stories” about disability “with commonly recognized
plots, symbols, themes, and characters.”24 The dominant stories of

22. This paper serves as the conceptual scaffolding for future (related) projects
that will explore the ways in which disability proceedings can be redesigned to
maximize the agency and dignity of the disputants.
23. This critique recognizes the complexity of invisibility with respect to parents or
families of people with disabilities who at times were advised to institutionalize their
children in their best interests. We see this history through a different lens today. The point
is to show that this history, irrespective of assignment of fault, had serious consequences
for the public consciousness of disability and identity of people with disabilities.
24. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1166 (1995). My concern here is not with the complex interplay between law and
social norms because a robust body of scholarship already exists. See, e.g., Scott
Burris, Disease Stigma in U.S. Public Health Law, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 179, 183–85
(2002) (discussing the relationship between law and social norms in the health
context); William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay
Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1396–1410
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disability that evolved reflect some form of incapacity.25 Without the
ready circulation of diverse narratives of disability demonstrative of
agency, early images and messages expressed by these laws became
accepted definitions and heuristics for processing disability. As a
result, the exclusion of people with disabilities from socio-economic
environments is more likely understood today as a benign, “natural”
consequence of different needs rather than discriminatory conduct.
A. Deviance
Perhaps the most overt form of the law’s historical concealment
of disability, municipal ordinances—known collectively as “ugly
laws”26—prohibited people with disabilities from appearing in
public places. These laws appeared as early as 1867 in San
Francisco, California and have served as grounds for a civil citation
as recently as 1974 in Omaha, Nebraska.27 The tradition of
concealing disability dates back even further to Elizabethan poor
laws.28 Marketed as an aggressive attack on public panhandling and
vagrancy, these ordinances fall squarely within the group of public
conduct rules designed to police normative deviance and shield the
nondisabled public from discomfort, disgust, ambivalence, or
(2000) (discussing the interaction between judicial review, social norms, and political
discourse in the sexual orientation context); Lessig, supra note 15, at 2182–83
(theorizing law’s relationship to normative change); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms
and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 923 (1996) (arguing a similar point that law
can strengthen the norms it reflects and weaken those it censures); cf. Matthew D.
Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1375–76
(2000) (critiquing expressive law theories and calling for increased empirical analyses).
25. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal AntiDiscrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 95 (2000) (“The sine qua non of disability was inability
to function in society. Hence, individuals with disabilities were to be pitied, excluded,
and/or cared for outside the mainstream of society.”). Feldblum notes that society
has distinguished between “disabled” and “sick” people, with the former perceived as
unable to function and, thus, excluded from society, and the latter having fewer if
any limitations and assumed to be participating members of society. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
26. See generally Marcia Pearce Burgdorf & Robert Burgdorf Jr., A History of
Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a “Suspect Class” Under
the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855, 863 (1975) (referring to these
ordinances, for the first time, collectively as “ugly laws”).
27. Most cities repealed ugly laws by 1915, but in many places, such as Omaha,
the statutes and ordinances remained on the books and, though infrequent, were the
basis for causes of action as recently as 1974.
28. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161–62 (1972)
(discussing the history and purposes of poor laws).
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contagion of ideas or disease.29 They reflect the foundations of
modern narratives of socio-economic dependency,30 incapacity, and
dangerousness. The following account, written at the turn of the
twentieth century, illustrates the deep “existential anxiety,”31
misinformation, and fear about disability that motivated enactment
of these laws:
In sociable intercourse the epileptic is an object of dread, and
no one who has witnessed the person in a convulsion can quite
escape from the haunting memory of the spectacle and entirely
free his mind from terror or disgust. Hence there cannot be
that free, unconstrained, and natural converse which gives
pleasure to society.32

These laws collectively labeled disability a “public nuisance,”
punishable by fine or jail. A New York appellate court, for example,
held that the sight of a ten-year old boy with a disability who was
“unable to stand, and obliged to move on his hands and legs” rose
to a level of speech that violated the local vagrancy ordinance
prohibiting “begging.”33
Charitable organizations played an integral role in shaping public
discourse on disability during the mid- to late-nineteenth century.
The dominant narratives of disability trace their roots to the early
moral reform efforts designed to convert a select number of
deserving poor from their morally flawed lives to socially and
economically productive ones. Consider the following petition to
the Mayor and City Council of New York in 1854:
Those shameful exhibitions of beggary . . . maimed, deformed
and sickly mendicants, making the most revolting display of their
misfortunes or infirmities, to excite sympathy; . . . no plea of
morality or humanity will justify these public parades of deformity
or distress. . . . Whatever the facts, they are vagrants under the
description of the statute, and law, humanity and public decency,

29. Public vagrancy laws historically have policed socially undesirable groups.
See, e.g., People v. Hale, 168 N.E.2d 518, 519 (N.Y. 1960) (applying vagrancy law to
“loitering pimps and prostitutes . . . [and] loitering homosexuals”).
30. See Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 809, 821–23 (1966) (discussing the origins of the connection
between disability and socio-economic dependence in social discourse).
31. Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences: Disability and Discrimination, 44
J. SOC. ISSUES 39, 43–44 (1988).
32. SCHWEIK, supra note 7, at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. In re Haller, 3 Abb. N. Cas. 65, 66 (N.Y. 1877).
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not only require their immediate removal [from public spaces],
but the absolute prohibition of all similar exhibitions in future.34

Most interesting is the identity of the petitioning organization above:
the Association for Improving the Conditions of the Poor. This
organization administered charitable assistance through a process of
moral sorting. The level of deservedness depended on the volitional
attributions imposed on the individual and his capacity for
productive employment.35 The moral hierarchy also shaped the
provision of public welfare benefits36 at the time that offered
children, veterans, and accident victims medical and rehabilitative
support with the goal of (re)integration into the workforce.37 These
interest groups—lead by nondisabled people—dominated the public’s
understanding of disability. They shaped and circulated narratives of
incapacity.38 These organizations focused on a disaggregated view of
disability of particular diseases or impairments that could (and
should) be eradicated through research and development.39
The relics of state-sponsored segregation—driven by social views of
disability as a “spoiled identity”40—continue to manifest in
surprisingly similar ways. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, for example, recently struck down a modern version of the
“ugly laws” that the City of Los Angeles used to police homeless
people living in their cars.41 The ordinance represents an increasing
move by states to criminalize public homelessness and “force the
homeless out of sight and out of mind.”42 While perhaps motivated
by some legitimate health and safety concerns, Los Angeles has
disproportionately applied the ordinance to homeless people with
disabilities.43 One in three homeless adults in Los Angeles has a
known physical, mental, or psychosocial disability.44
Thus,
enforcement of this ordinance has had a disparate impact on this
group and contributes to removal of people with disabilities from the
public sphere today.
B. Incapacity
The rise of involuntary institutionalization of people with
intellectual and developmental disabilities began in the late
nineteenth century and was influenced by the growing eugenics
movement in the United States.45 Close to 200,000 people lived in

34. Street-Begging and Vagrancy, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, Feb. 24, 1854, at 3 (providing the
text of a Public Petition by the Association for Improving the Conditions of the Poor
to the City Council and Mayor of New York City in support of greater enforcement of
municipal vagrancy laws).
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35. The Poor, BALT. SUN, Nov. 28, 1850, at 1 (advocating on behalf of the
Association for Improving Conditions for the Poor for greater enforcement of public
vagrancy laws as a part of broader anti-poverty efforts); see also The Suffering Poor, N.Y.
DAILY TIMES, Feb. 18, 1854, at 4 (indicating that the Association ensures that
applicants truly need support before receiving it).
36. Growth of disability-specific organizations such as the National Spinal Cord
Injury Association, Muscular Dystrophy Association, United Cerebral Palsy,
developed in the first half of the 20th Century to respond to a need for research into
“cures” and interventions to support rehabilitation. Over time, these organizations
controlled the narratives of specific disabilities and the overall public discourse
regarding disability as a medical diagnosis in need of a cure.
37. Robert Funk, Disability Rights: From Caste to Class in the Context of Civil
Rights, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 7, 10 (Alan Gartner & Tom
Joe eds., 1987).
38. See MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM GO AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER
REEVE & THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS 28 (2003) (explaining the normative
association of disability and pity).
39. See Lloyd Burton, Jr., Federal Assistance for Disabled Persons: Law and Policy in
Uncertain Transition, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 753, 754 (1982). National disability
rights organizations have protested fundraisers such as the annual Jerry Lewis
Muscular Dystrophy Association Telethon because they infantilize people with
disabilities and advance the medical model of disability as the foundation of their
fundraising efforts. See, e.g., Evan Kemp Jr., Aiding the Disabled: No Pity, Please, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 1981, at A19 (arguing that the telethon’s “pity approach to fundraising” perpetuates the stereotypes that people with disabilities are “childlike,
helpless, hopeless, nonfunctioning and noncontributing members of society”); see
also Ben Mattlin, Personal Perspective: An Open Letter to Jerry Lewis: The Disabled Need
Dignity, Not Pity, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/print/199109-1/opinion/op-2249_1_dear-jerry-lewis (arguing that annual charitable telethons
seeking financial support for people with disabilities reinforce stigmas about people
with disabilities).
40. See infra note 139 (providing Erving Goffman’s definition of stigma); see also
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (declaring Virginia’s ban on interracial
marriage unconstitutional); Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s
Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1315 (2009) [hereinafter
Emens, Intimate Discrimination] (discussing how U.S. law “required rather than
prohibited discrimination in the intimate realm” by regulating marriage,
procreation, and other sexual relations).
41. Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2014).
42. The number of cities that ban sleeping in cars, for example, has increased
from thirty-seven in 2011 to eighty-one in 2014. Editorial, Shunting the Homeless from
Sight, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2014, at A.24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/07/17/opinion/Shunting-the-Homeless-From-Sight.html?_r=0.
43. Desertrain, 754 F.3d at 1149 n.1 (noting that four of the named plaintiffs were
homeless people with disabilities).
44. See L.A. HOMELESSNESS SERVS. AUTH., 2013 GREATER LOS ANGELES HOMELESS
COUNT: OVERALL RESULTS FOR LOS ANGELES COUNTY AND LOS ANGELES CONTINUUM OF
CARE 36 (2014) (reporting that people with mental or psychosocial disabilities
comprised 30.2% of the Los Angeles homeless population in 2013).
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state-operated institutions in the 1960s, the peak of
institutionalization of people with intellectual and developmental
disabilities.46 Justice Marshall in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.47 documented the systematic segregation experienced by
people with intellectual and developmental disabilities:
A regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation soon
emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed
paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow. Massive custodial
institutions were built to warehouse the retarded for life; the aim
was to halt reproduction of the retarded and “nearly extinguish
their race.” Retarded children were categorically excluded from
public schools, based on the false stereotype that all were
ineducable and on the purported need to protect nonretarded
children from them. . . . But most important, lengthy and continuing
isolation . . . has perpetuated the ignorance, irrational fears, and
stereotyping that long have plagued them.48

By the mid-1950s, about half a million people (more than twice the
number of people with intellectual disabilities) resided in public
psychiatric hospitals.49 The deinstitutionalization movement expanded
by the 1970s in response to increased incidences of abuse and neglect
in settings of weak accountability mechanisms.50 The number of
45. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 461–64
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (chronicling the
history of institutionalization for people with mental and psychosocial disabilities in
the United States); see also U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE
SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 18–20 (1983) (discussing the history of shame and
exclusion of people with disabilities).
46. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation,
34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2012) (acknowledging a decline in the rate of
institutionalization since its peak in 1967).
47. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
48. Id. at 462–64 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added); see also WILLIE V. BRYAN, IN SEARCH OF FREEDOM: HOW PERSONS
WITH DISABILITIES HAVE BEEN DISENFRANCHISED FROM THE MAINSTREAM OF AMERICAN
SOCIETY 7 (1996) (“[S]ome families with members who had a disability considered
the most appropriate action was to send them to an institution and keep them away
from the public.”); David Ferleger, The Constitutional Right to Community Services, 26
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 766 (2010) (arguing that “involuntary institutionalization of
people with intellectual disabilities is unconstitutional on due process and equal
protection grounds”); Arlene S. Kanter, There’s No Place Like Home: The Right to Live in
the Community for People with Disabilities, Under International Law and the Domestic Laws of
the United States and Israel, 45 ISR. L. REV. 181, 197–98 (2012) (discussing the history of
the “right to live” movement in the United States).
49. Bagenstos, supra note 46, at 7–9.
50. See, e.g., ANN BRADEN JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE TRUTH ABOUT
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION 3–4 (1990) (explaining that deinstitutionalization began
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people committed to psychiatric hospitals (as well as the number of
hospitals themselves) drastically decreased over time.51 The lack of
supportive services, however—such as housing, employment
opportunities, and supplemental economic assistance—has
significantly undermined the deinstitutionalization process by
substituting jails and prisons with few or no social services for former
psychiatric institutions.52
The persistent denial of meaningful opportunities for selfdetermination has foiled efforts for greater inclusion of people with
disabilities. This was particularly true in institutional settings. For
example, in Wyatt v. Stickney,53 an institutional reform case in
Alabama, an expert witness for the Department of Justice testified
about this very phenomenon:
[I]f you walk through [Alabama’s largest institution for people with
intellectual disabilities] . . . you can see the effect—the people who

once technology and a deeper understanding of psychiatric treatment led to a
change in how society perceived disabled individuals); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE
DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 295
(1971) (discussing history of the deinstitutionalization movement); see also U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HRD652, RETURNING THE MENTALLY DISABLED TO THE
COMMUNITY: GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO DO MORE 1 (1977) (calling on Congress to invest
additional resources and clarify responsibilities of federal agencies to promote
community-based living). But see, e.g., E. FULLER TORREY, THE INSANITY OFFENSE: HOW
AMERICA’S FAILURE TO TREAT THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL ENDANGERS ITS CITIZENS 1–2
(2008) (arguing to the contrary that the deinstitutionalization movement was a
failure and resulted in significant public risk because psychiatric patients were
removed from mental hospitals and placed in the community, often without
adequate community-based services). For a more nuanced review of the arguments,
see Bagenstos, supra note 46, at 5–6.
While the aggregate percentage of
institutionalized persons has decreased nationally, the aggregate numbers show that
somewhere between one and two thousand people with intellectual disabilities in each
state continue to reside in state-run institutions. Id. at 8–9.
51. See Bagenstos, supra note 46, at 9 (noting that by 2003, the number of people
in psychiatric facilities decreased to around 50,000 people and that the number of
public psychiatric hospitals decreased from 310 in 1970 to 220 in 2000).
52. Letter from Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of N.Y. et al., to Hon.
Bill de Blasio, Mayor of N.Y.C. et al. (Aug. 4, 2014) (on file with author) (describing
the rampant abuse of adolescent inmates in Riker’s Island jail and noting that one in
two adolescent inmates has one or more diagnosed mental or psychosocial disabilities
and that seventy-five percent of all adolescent inmates in punitive segregation have a
known mental or psychosocial disability); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 3 (2006)
(noting, nationally, that fifty-six percent of state prisoners, forty-five percent of federal
prisoners, and sixty-four percent of local jail inmates have a known mental disability).
53. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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begin to become involved in eccentric mannerisms, the rocking
back and forth, peculiar behavior mechanisms, the people who sit
in a semi-stupor in a place, without any activity, the people who
slowly deteriorate and turn to the simple elements of human
behavior. . . . I can assure you that this kind of behavior is due to
neglect and is not an outcome of [intellectual disability] itself. . . .
[W]e have ample documentation in this country that individuals who
come to institutions and can . . . talk will stop talking, who come to
institutions and can feed themselves will stop feeding themselves;
in other words, in many other ways, a steady process of deterioration.54

State-sponsored denials of citizenship to people with disabilities
based on presumptions of incapacity took other forms in addition to
systematic segregation in institutions. Forced sterilizations, for
example, in line with the predominant eugenics ideology in the first
half of the twentieth century, denied people with disabilities their
autonomous right to procreation.55
Other examples include
prohibitions or limitations on marriage,56 custody,57 adoption,58
voting,59 and jury service.60

54. Stanley S. Herr, Rights and Advocacy for Retarded People 108 n.7 (1883)
(fourth and fifth alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Record at 24,
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom,
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974)).
55. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (arguing in defense of
sanctioning the forced sterilization of people with intellectual disabilities that “[i]t is
better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. . . . Three generations of imbeciles are
enough”); see also Emens, Intimate Discrimination, supra note 40, at 1390 (“[P]eople
with disabilities have been treated as if outside the sexual realm altogether.”).
56. See, e.g., State v. Wyman, 173 A. 155, 156 (Conn. 1934) (explaining that the
purpose of a statute prohibiting marriage to people with intellectual disabilities was
to “check the increase of mental defectives and abnormal persons in the community
which results by inheritance from defective parents”); Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality,
Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 397–424 (1997) (cataloguing
state statutes discussing the ability of people with mental disabilities to consent to sex
and the statutes’ relationships to rape laws).
57. See, e.g., Ella Callow et al., Parents with Disabilities in the United States: Prevalence,
Perspectives, and a Proposal for Legislative Change to Protect the Right to Family in the
Disability Community, 17 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 9, 10 (2011) (“Children from families
with parental disability are unnecessarily removed from the custody of their parents
at alarming rates.”).
58. See, e.g., Michael E. Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, 63 EMORY L.J.
527, 550–51 (2014) (discussing an adoption challenge in California concerning the
Equal Protection Clause).
59. See, e.g., Michael Waterstone, Constitutional and Statutory Voting Rights for People
with Disabilities, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 353, 357–59 (2003) (providing a
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C. Separate but Unequal
Presumed by society as ineducable, students with disabilities have
(and continue to) receive segregated education. States and school
districts, by design, excluded children with disabilities from public
education prior to the promulgation of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975.61 Children with disabilities, both
physical and mental, received little or qualitatively inferior education
based on assumptions of incapacity that produced low expectations
for their achievement.62 As recently as 1965, for example, one year
after the promulgation of the Civil Rights Act, North Carolina
attached criminal penalties to aggressive parental challenges to state
determinations that their children were ineducable.63
Today, the lack of financial support for public schools has
produced de facto segregation of students with disabilities, often
resulting in placement of these students in private (“nonpublic”)

comprehensive discussion of key legal issues in and the history of voting rights of
people with disabilities).
60. Early cases noted the categorical prohibitions against people with perceived
or known mental and psychosocial disabilities serving on juries irrespective of their
capacities. See, e.g., People v. Ross, 24 P. 789, 789 (Cal. 1890) (“All the authorities
admit that when any juror becomes mentally disabled, by sickness or intoxication, it
is proper to discharge the jury; and whether the mental inability be produced by
sickness, fatigue, or incurable prejudice, the result must be the same.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
61. Pub. L. No. 9442, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–
1482 (2012)). The Education for the Handicapped Act (EHA), which preceded the
EAHCA in 1974, aimed to extend Title VI to the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2); see also Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.
Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that the exclusion of children with disabilities
from public school programs violated due process); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children
v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258–59 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (concluding that the
denial of educational services to children with intellectual disabilities violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
62. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Cambridge, 32 N.E. 864, 864–65 (Mass. 1893)
(upholding the expulsion of a student who was “weak in mind” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 9432, at 11 (1975) (discussing the need for
supportive, integrated education for children with disabilities); Jeffrey J. Zettel &
Joseph Ballard, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (P.L. 9442): Its
History, Origins, and Concepts, 12 in SPECIAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA: ITS LEGAL AND
GOVERNMENTAL FOUNDATIONS 11, 12 (Joseph Ballard et al. eds., 1982) (examining
state school systems’ policies prior to 1973, many of which “excluded children who
were blind, deaf, ‘feebleminded,’ or seriously emotionally disturbed on the grounds
that there were no educational programs to meet their needs”).
63. See 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 641, 643–44 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11565
(1955), which, in 1961, was amended to substitute “director” for “superintendent”).
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schools designed to serve students with disabilities exclusively.64
School districts place students who are unable to achieve “some
educational benefit”65 despite education support or who require
greater behavioral interventions into increasingly restrictive (or less
integrated) settings.66 They range from specialized classrooms within
a school, to alternative education settings within the public school
system, to private placements at the public’s expense. Integrated
education requires sufficient resources (e.g., aides, sign language
interpreters, and assistive technology) to make meaningful access a
viable choice for students with disabilities.67 This is not to say that the
costs of integration (financial or otherwise) should surpass the costs
of private education.68 In fact, recent studies suggest that, when
accounting for the costs of litigation, the costs associated with private,
specialized education may exceed those associated with the support
services and architectural and curricular adjustments necessary for
integrated education.69
While the Individuals with Disabilities

64. See Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 789, 821–23 (2006) (analyzing court decisions allowing public school
districts to use cost as a factor in considering whether to provide integrated programs
for students with disabilities).
65. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982) (“[T]he requirement [is]
that the education to which access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational
benefit upon the handicapped child.” (emphasis added)). This is not to suggest that
parents or advocates should not pursue private placements for individual clients.
Rather, I want to draw attention to the current tug of war (quite evident in the
District of Columbia) between the need for large scale systemic reform to increase
the capacity of public schools to provide integrated education where appropriate and
the needs of individual students who are not receiving needed (and statutorily
protected) special education services.
66. See Diatta v. District of Columbia, 319 F. Supp. 2d 57, 66–67 (D.D.C. 2004)
(reviewing a case of an autistic child who had not received adequate educational
opportunities in a public school district and holding that the school district was
required to tailor appropriate education to fit the child’s needs). Schools are
increasingly placing children into more restrictive settings. See, e.g., T.P. ex rel. S.P. v.
Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(concluding that an individualized education program satisfies substantive
requirements when it produces “progress” not “regression”).
67. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200 (explaining that Congress implicitly requires
disabled students to receive “some educational benefit” as part of their entitlement
to a free public education).
68. See Barnett v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 154 (4th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam) (“Congress intended the states to balance the competing interests of
economic necessity, on the one hand, and the special needs of a handicapped child,
on the other, when making education placement decisions.”).
69. See, e.g., Samuel L. Odom et al., The Costs of Inclusive and Traditional Special
Education Preschool Services, 14 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 33, 38 (2001) (reporting

HARRIS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/20/2015 8:00 PM

PROCESSING DISABILITY

475

Education Act (IDEA)70 has successfully established a system of due
process protections for students with disabilities, it has been less
successful in its primary goal of eliminating barriers between general
and special education, making inclusive education less than a reality.71
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND STIGMA
Popular narratives of the ADA reflect its success as the “greatest
victory of the modern disability rights movement,”72 an
“emancipation proclamation” for people with disabilities,73 and a
“landmark” moment akin to the collapse of the Berlin Wall.74 The
ADA (at least rhetorically) challenged the dominant philosophy of
fundamental differences that historically justified the exclusion of
people with disabilities.75 Yet there is broad consensus among

on empirical data suggesting that the cost of instructional services in integrated
educational settings is generally less than or comparable to the cost of specialized,
private placement). For two interesting perspectives on the inclusion debate, see
Colker, supra note 64, at 796 (challenging through empirical data the presumption
of integrated education as violative of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) for certain disabled children); Mark C. Weber, A Nuanced Approach to the
Disability Integration Presumption, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 174, 174–75 (2007)
(arguing that the presumption of integration has continued utility as a standard and
can be challenged accordingly).
70. See Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990). IDEA is the successor
legislation to the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-142, 88 Stat. 773.
71. See Lisa J. Walker, Procedural Rights in the Wrong System: Special Education is Not
Enough, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, supra note 37, at 97, 108 (“[W]ithout adjusting
the organization of services within schools, changing attitudes toward disability,
altering the substantial state and local funding streams that make it difficult to treat
disabled students as part of the mainstream, nor collapsing the categorical
definitions that define the population as being different [special education laws] may
have served to reinforce a hybrid structure—one with elaborate protections to assure
the rights of disabled students, but carried out by a separate delivery system of special
education services . . . outside the normal scope of school business.”).
72. Rogers M. Smith, Foreword, in VOICES FROM THE EDGE: NARRATIVES ABOUT THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, v, viii (Ruth O’Brien ed., 2004).
73. 135 CONG. REC. 19,888 (1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see also 136
CONG. REC. 17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
74. President George H.W. Bush, Remarks at the Signing of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (July 26, 1990), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/
35th/videos/ada_signing_text.html.
75. See, e.g., Adrienne Asch, Critical Race Theory, Feminism, and Disability: Reflections
on Social Justice and Personal Identity, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 398–99 (2001) (“No matter
how court decisions chip away at its reach, and no matter how poorly federal
agencies enforce its provisions, the [ADA] provides a tangible assertion that the
federal government believes in the moral equality and worth of people with
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scholars across disciplines that the ADA has not lived up to its initial
hype.76 Scholars nonetheless diverge with respect to the ADA’s
degree of success, empirical questions of causation and correlation,
and the appropriate evaluative measures (e.g., an economic matrix,77
economic plus matrix,78 rights-consciousness matrix,79 expressive law

disabilities and believes that people can benefit from, and contribute to, the
common life of the society.”); Burris, supra note 24, at 185 (describing the
“[h]egemony” of stigma that can be challenged through expressive laws and shift the
uncontestable hegemony to an “ideology” that does not reflect normative views
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
76. See, e.g., SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE
DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2009) (offering a slightly different critique of the ADA
by attributing the ADA’s limited success to the plurality of the disability rights
movement itself); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants, 34 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 99, 99–100 (1999) (offering empirical data to
support the practical effect of limited judicial interpretation, including that
“defendants prevail in more than ninety-three percent of reported ADA employment
discrimination cases decided on the merits at the trial court level” (footnote
omitted)); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Introduction, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA:
REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS 1, 5–11 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003)
(discussing the limited judicial interpretation of the protected class based on the
ADA’s facially vague gateway definitions); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 480–94 (1992)
(arguing that misperceptions of costs of accommodations as well as the costs of
mandating accommodations rather than allowing for market-based cost-shifting has
limited the success of Title I of the ADA); Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53
STAN. L. REV. 223, 275 (2000) [hereinafter Jolls, Accommodation Mandates] (same).
77. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment
Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 917
(2001) (suggesting that employment of people with disabilities declined in small and
medium firms in part because of ADA exemptions); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and
Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RES. 693, 694, 711
(2000) (arguing that the employment of people with disabilities has declined since
and because of the ADA); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities
Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 923 (2003) (characterizing the
ADA’s success as “anything but radical” in this area).
78. See Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 76, at 275 (predicting that the
relative post-ADA wages of disabled workers will increase or remain unchanged while
the employment rate will continue to decrease). Jolls re-positions the economic
analyses of accommodation mandates (Lawrence Summers’s theory of mandates
directed to workers) to account for the interaction with antidiscrimination laws, i.e.,
successful implementation and enforcement depends on the allocation of costs and
liability between the employer and employee. Id. at 225 & n.2, 232.
79. The rights-consciousness matrix measures the extent to which people with
disabilities see themselves and are perceived as rights holders. See, e.g., DAVID M.
ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE
STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 10 (2003) (arguing that study of life stories
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matrix,80 jurisprudential matrix,81 and attitudinal matrix,82 among
others). These matrices intersect; for example, they all address
greater public visibility and reduced stigmatization at some level.
Varied frameworks offer distinct angles—each with a unique focal
point—to assess the socio-economic impact of the ADA. Still, none of
the available analytical lenses quite addresses the question of
historical invisibility at sufficient depth to understand the role of the
ADA in the perpetuation of existing or creation of new forms of
invisibility or stigma.
A. Intent and Design
Despite the more radical articulation of the ADA’s mission and
goals espoused in public discourse, most accounts of Congress’s
legislative intent83 for the ADA reflect a much more modest yet still
celebratory goal at its outset: to extend the employment protections
afforded people with disabilities under the 1973 Rehabilitation Act in
private employment and fill in the gaps in protection from existing
employment discrimination laws. For example, the ADA sought to
extend section 504 protections to private employers and eliminate
the requirement of disability as the “sole[]” basis of discrimination.84
of people with disabilities over time reveals the ways in which rights, such as those
under the ADA, become active or remain dormant).
80. Michael Ashley Stein, Book Review, Under the Empirical Radar: An Initial
Expressive Law Analysis of the ADA, 90 VA. L. REV. 1151, 1155 (2004) (citations omitted)
(reviewing ENGEL & MUNGER, supra note 79, through an expressive law analysis of the
ADA as well as “examining the phenomena that exist beneath the empirical radar”).
81. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 76, at 100 & n.9, 108 (reporting on empirical data
showing that, under Title I of the ADA, defendants prevailed in ninety-three percent
of cases at the federal district court level and in eighty-four percent of cases in which
losing plaintiffs appealed their judgments); see also RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY
PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 83–85 (2005)
(noting that, as a relative matter, plaintiffs seeking relief under Title I of the ADA
have fared worse than those under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act); cf. Sharona
Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 305, 306–07
(2008) (offering data from Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
resolutions, settlement statistics, and etcetera to support employers’ responsiveness
to disability discrimination claims).
82. See Emens, Framing Disability, supra note 20, at 1410–34 (suggesting, with
examples, three ways that framing could change attitudes toward disabilities).
83. Feldblum, supra note 25, at 126–28 (discussing the political and legislative
history surrounding the drafting and passage of the ADA, including several versions
of the ADA penned by advocates and congressional staff).
84. SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES: THE LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 23 (2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2012) (defining “covered
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Legislative history and accounts by former legislative staff indicate
that Congress adopted, almost verbatim, the definition of disability85
from then-existing section 504 regulations.86 The design of section
504 itself mirrors that of the antidiscrimination provisions in Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.87 Robert Scotch explains that this progressive
incorporation omitted a critical analysis or broad-based discussion
about the appropriateness of applying existing antidiscrimination
frameworks to disability.88 This might explain some of the current
challenges to implementation and evolution of social movements
around a shared (and clearly defined) experience of discrimination
on the basis of disability.
The ADA aspired to transform the daily lives of people with
disabilities by increasing visibility in employment and public spaces.
In fact, Congress explicitly documented the historic invisibility
discussed in Part I (though not the law’s contribution in rendering it
so) as evidence of the need for the remedial provisions of the ADA.89
entity” and “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has 15 or more employees for each working day . . .” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); § 12112(a) (limiting applicability of the ADA to “covered entit[ies]”).
More broadly, the ADA only applies to individuals with statutorily defined “disabilities”:
“(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)).” § 12102.
85. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 used the term “handicapped.”
Pub. L. No. 9312, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 701). In contrast, Congress chose to use “disability” when it enacted the ADA in
1990. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 3, 104 Stat.
327, 329 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102). The provisions are nearly
identical with the exception of the change in language. Section 504 has been
amended to reflect the term “disability.” Id.
86. In fact, Chai Feldblum, credited as among the legislative staffers responsible
for versions of the ADA, notes that Robert Silverstein, at the time a staffer for Senator
Tom Harkin, intentionally tracked the language of section 504’s regulatory
definition of disability with its tested track record instead of the former definition
offered in an earlier draft penned by Robert Burgdorf, formerly with the National
Council on the Handicapped. Feldblum, supra note 25, at 126–27; see also Robert L.
Burgdorf, Jr., Restoring the ADA and Beyond: Disability in the 21st Century, 13 TEX. J. C.L.
& C.R. 241, 248 (2008) (chronicling the experience).
87. Feldblum, supra note 25, at 98–99 (citations omitted).
88. Id.
89. Congress provided that
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive
social problem; . . .
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Congress sought to address the history of invisibility primarily by
bringing people with disabilities into the employment sector in
greater numbers.90 Ideologically, this reflects shared cultural norms
about employment as a primary locus of identity formation and
agency enhancement.91 More specifically, Congress sought to expand
employment opportunities for people with disabilities who wished to
work (and could do so) but were precluded from doing so because of
misperceptions and social stigmas about their functional limitations.92
Accordingly, Congress designed the ADA to “assure equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic
self-sufficiency for such individuals.”93
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory
effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers,
overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to existing
facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria,
segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits,
jobs, or other opportunities . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (5).
90. Bagenstos, supra note 77, at 957–75 (noting congressional intent that the
ADA would improve the employment status of people with disabilities); see also H.R.
Rep. No. 10185, pt. 2, at 22–23 (1990) (adding that the ADA employment provisions
incorporate the standards in the regulations promulgating section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
91. The ADA expressed Congress’s intent to change social norms of disability
through employment, a purpose that is in line with our Western liberal focus on
the connection of work to our identity. See Vicki Schultz, Essay, Life’s Work, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1884 (2000) (“Our historical conception of citizenship, our
sense of community, and our sense that we are of value to the world all depend
importantly on the work we do for a living and how it is organized and understood
by the larger society.”).
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)–(b)(1) (detailing some of Congress’s findings and
purpose for the ADA).
93. Id. § 12101(a)(7). Specifically, the purpose of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 was
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals
with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power
to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in
order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by
people with disabilities.
Id. § 12101(b).
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B. Assessing the ADA’s Record of Visibility and Integration
The ADA sought to remedy the legacy of segregation experienced
by people with disabilities primarily in two areas: public spaces and
employment.
However, while the ADA has generated greater
integration of people with disabilities (and as a positive byproduct,
greater social visibility) in some respects, it has not generated greater
opportunities for people with disabilities to meaningfully interact with
nondisabled people in public settings so as to challenge existing stigma.
Title II of the ADA, for example, requires that state and local
governments provide an equal opportunity to people with disabilities
to benefit from all state and local government programs and services
such as public education, employment, and transportation.94
Notably, plaintiffs have successfully used Title II to challenge
prohibitions on marriage,95 segregated community residential
placements96 through exclusionary zoning ordinances,97 and denials
of rights and responsibilities of citizenship, including jury service.98
Furthermore, Title III of the ADA has produced greater visibility of
people with disabilities in public spaces through its affirmative
accessibility requirements in public accommodations such as public
transportation and, more well-known, parking spaces, restrooms, and

94. Id. § 12132 (“Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”).
95. E.g., T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp. 110, 111 (D. Utah 1993) (invalidating a
state law that voided marriage by people with AIDS).
96. E.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587, 607 (1999) (holding
that Title II of the ADA requires states “to provide community-based treatment for
persons with mental disabilities when the State’s treatment professionals determine
that such placement is appropriate, the affected persons do not oppose such
treatment, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account
the resources available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities”).
97. E.g., City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 728 (1995)
(concluding that the federal statute prohibiting discrimination in housing based on
disability should be interpreted to allow a challenge to a city zoning provision that
limited the number of unrelated occupants allowed in a dwelling because the
provision failed to reasonably accommodate a group home for recovering addicts).
98. E.g., Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12, 20 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding
that the blanket exclusion of blind people from jury pool violates the ADA); see also
Laura E. Walvoord, Comment, A Critique of Torcasio v. Murray and the Use of the Clear
Statement Rule to Interpret the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1183, 1188
nn.26–30 (1996) (providing additional examples of plaintiffs’ successes in
challenging policies geared towards marriage, social services, zoning, jury selection,
and licensing under Title II).
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architectural redesigns such as the addition of entrance ramps.99 Yet
the ADA’s remedial structure in many ways creates “rights without
remedies” with respect to public entities by denying plaintiffs
monetary damages.100 Weak enforcement of Title II and the lack of a
threat of damages beyond cases of “intentional discrimination,”101
coupled with Title III’s sole remedy of injunctive relief,102 continue to
limit the ADA’s deterrent value and promise of integration.103 Title I
of the ADA has been even less successful in increasing the visibility of
disability in employment to the degree predicted.104 Congress anticipated
that increased contact and interaction among people with disabilities
and the nondisabled would decrease prejudice, generate new social
narratives, and, accordingly, reduce social stigma. However, this did
not happen for at least three reasons, discussed below.
1.

The absence of new market entrants and implicit bias
First, existing analyses of the impact of the ADA largely measure the
degree of increased participation of people with disabilities in the
formal economy, which, empirically, has shown little growth over

99. Significant accessibility issues still exist in areas of transportation such as
sidewalks and curb cuts, air travel, and taxi service. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Original
Complaint and Request for Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief at 4–5,
Ramos v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 14CV00502 (W.D. Tex. June 2, 2014) (alleging
Title III violations against Uber and Lyft for failing to accommodate people with
mobility impairments).
100. See Steven D. Smith, Courts, Creativity, and the Duty to Decide a Case, 1985 U. ILL.
L. REV. 573, 626 (1985) (critiquing the notion of a “right without a remedy” as
counter to “ordinary usage and in traditional rights discourse” because rights are
“functional,” not “metaphysical”).
101. Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1824 (2005).
102. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 377, 381 (2000) (explaining that under ADA Title III, private parties are
only entitled to injunctive relief); Michael E. Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights,
and Voting, 56 ALA. L. REV. 793, 833 (2005) (analyzing the ineffectiveness of the Title
III injunctive relief remedy).
103. See Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans
with Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 315
(2009) (reviewing the backlash effect that employers and the public have expressed
towards the ADA).
104. The design of employment protections as a means to greater integration
turns on a well-established social psychology and behavioral economics reliance on
contact theory. See, e.g., GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 41–42, 44,
46 (1954) (suggesting that increased contact between in-group and out-group
members can improve attitudes of in-group members towards those in the out-group).
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time and at the moment is in decline.105 Labor market participation
rates for people with disabilities ages sixteen and older steadily
declined over the last four years, from 22.4% in 2009 (compared to a
nondisabled rate of 70.9%), to 20.3% in 2013 (compared to a
nondisabled rate of 68.9%).106 The unemployment rate for people
with disabilities continues to rise and is significantly higher than that
of nondisabled persons.107 Understandably, there are other variables
at work, such as increased life expectancy108 and severity of the
disability. Disaggregation of the data, however, paints an even
bleaker picture. By excluding the population with disabilities over
age sixty-five, the unemployment rate for the working age population
with disabilities109 doubles compared to those without a disability.110
While it is difficult to sufficiently isolate the host of variables
necessary to establish causation, the ADA’s legislative design offers
some insight into why the ADA has not affirmatively produced a
greater number of new market entrants. According to Christine Jolls,
the ADA’s cost distribution of compliance with the ADA’s
“accommodation[s] mandate,” for example, produced a net
disincentive for employers to increase the number of employees with

105. See, e.g., THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A POLICY
PUZZLE 4–5, 9 (David C. Stapleton & Richard V. Burkhauser eds., 2003) (showing an
overall decline in employment rates for disabled persons in the 1990s when
employment rates for those without disabilities were increasing); Acemoglu &
Angrist, supra note 77, at 929–32 (concluding that the ADA resulted in the decline of
employment rates for workers with disabilities and an increase in litigation because
many employers concluded that it was less expensive to litigate than to comply with
ADA regulations); DeLeire, supra note 77, at 705–08 (providing empirical data that
showed the ADA did not improve wages for disabled men and led to a decline in
employment rates for disabled workers in manual labor and managerial
occupations); Stein, supra note 80, at 1154 (“[F]rom a purely quantitative
perspective, empirical analysis indicates that the ADA is not fulfilling its promise of
empowering workers with disabilities.”).
106. These statistics were downloaded from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL)
website and are on file with the author.
107. See Jeffrey Sparshott, People with Disabilities Face 13.4% Unemployment Rate,
WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2013, 3:38 PM), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/
2013/06/12/people-with-disabilities-face-13-4-unemployment-rate (“About 8 in 10
persons with disabilities weren’t in the labor force in 2012, compared with about 3 in
10 persons with no disability . . . .”).
108. Id. (showing that people with disabilities over the age of 65 may be retirees
who are seeking to reenter the market).
109. Id.; see BRAULT, supra note 6, at 10 & n.22 (measuring employment among
those ages twenty-one through sixty-four).
110. See Sparshott, supra note 107 (confirming that 14.6% of those of working age
who have disabilities are unemployed, compared to 7.9% of those without disabilities).
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disabilities.111 Jolls posits that an employer’s inability to shift the costs
of accommodations (or perceived costs) to the employee through
such methods as decreased wages because of antidiscrimination laws,
combined with the low probability of enforcement of ADA
prohibitions on hiring discrimination, had two notable effects on the
market. First, she suggests that it offered greater protections and
benefits for existing employees (those already in the job market) and,
second, little incentives for employers to affirmatively seek applicants
with disabilities as part of broader diversity efforts.112 Furthermore,
actual or perceived costs associated with accommodations may
interact with existing explicit or implicit biases113 about diminished
capacity or productivity of an applicant with a disability to remove the
candidate from consideration at an initial résumé review stage.114
The ADA does not capture the operation of implicit (or explicit)
bias at the early stages of the hiring process. The employer may be
unaware of the implicit biases guiding her often split-second
decisions and, even if self-aware, her failure to interview produces
evidentiary challenges (failure to interview is not the same as failure
to hire). Commencement of litigation requires a plaintiff who
interprets the failure to receive an interview or an offer as
discrimination rather than a personal issue of credentials or
qualifications. Also, this potential plaintiff would have to come
forward with the necessary resources to adjudicate her rights under
the ADA. Empirical data, however, shows a striking imbalance
between cases brought under the ADA for failure to accommodate or
improper termination compared to failure to hire.115 Thus, the ADA
111. Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 76, at 274–76; cf. Michael Ashley
Stein, Empirical Implications of Title I, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1671, 1674–77 (2000) (arguing
that most requested accommodations are inexpensive).
112. See Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 76, at 275 (explaining that the
difficulty in proving discrimination at the hiring stage may account for fewer cases
initiated by potential plaintiffs under Title I).
113. Implicit bias manifests in discriminatory behavior. Perhaps most important
for legal scholars are the findings that what people ordinarily may associate with
“controllable behaviors” may actually be prone to implicit biases primarily under
three conditions: (1) “inattentiveness to task”; (2) “time pressure or other cognitive
[over]load”; and (3) “ambiguity,” or the existence of multiple biased and non-biased
explanations. Marianne Bertrand et al., New Approaches to Discrimination: Implicit
Discrimination, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 94, 95 (2005).
114. See id. at 94–95 (reviewing the potential for implicit discrimination against job
applicants based on the information provided in résumés).
115. See Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 76, at 275 (examining the
challenges faced by workers with disabilities in proving discrimination in an
employer’s hiring practices).
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likely increased protections for existing employees but has not
generated litigation and other disincentives against hiring
discrimination to usher in new entrants to the job market.
Irrespective of the lack of consensus about causation or correlation of
the ADA to the market as an empirical matter,116 the number of
people with disabilities in the workforce did not increase—and, in
fact, may have declined—counter to the goals of the ADA.117 Also,
the ADA, by design, did not reach collateral requirements for market
participation, such as improved opportunities for a quality education
or vocational training or access to health care and affordable
housing, that make it possible for people with disabilities to compete
on an equal footing with nondisabled persons.
2.

The face of disability in the workplace
Second, the focus on existing employees limits the visibility of
diverse disabilities in the workplace, and as some suggest, may
generate additional animus towards people with known or visible
disabilities. The ADA’s definition of disability, although amended in
2008 to account for several flaws,118 limited protection to those with
“qualified” disabilities under a three-part functional limitations test.
Protection under the ADA extended to an individual with functional
limitations (disabled enough) and, yet, who was still able to perform
the essential functions of a position.119 As a result, disability in the
workplace looks more like diabetes than quadriplegia. This limited
exposure to diverse disabilities leads to two consequences with
respect to narratives of disability: it does little to diversify and
challenge stigma attached to historically less visible disabilities such as
116. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Review Essay, Has the Americans with Disabilities Act
Reduced Employment for People with Disabilities? The Decline in Employment of People with
Disabilities: A Policy Puzzle, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 527, 537 n.63 (2004) (citing
the ratio of discharge to hiring cases as ten to one, which is substantially higher than
for Title VII cases).
117. Scholars have a more optimistic view that the early information and
implementation costs of compliance—in particular, the costs of accommodations—
may decrease over time. This trend, combined with greater improvements in
education for young people with disabilities and ADA Title II and Title III
enforcement, may produce a long-term gain. Id. at 558–63.
118. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 11025, §§ 2(a)(3), 2(b)(3)–
(4), 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553–55 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12102 (2012))
(overturning Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and its
companion cases).
119. Compare id. (providing coverage without consideration of mitigating measures
such as eyeglasses), with Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
§ 3, 104 Stat. 327, 329–30 (providing coverage without mitigation).
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intellectual, developmental, mental, or psychosocial disabilities, and
the narratives of disability generated may reflect greater resentment
among nondisabled coworkers.
In the context of intellectual, developmental, mental, and
psychosocial disabilities, for example, the ADA has more bark than
bite. The expressive value of defining “disability” as “physical or
mental impairment”120 cannot be overstated.121 Congress explicitly
proclaimed that “[t]he underlying premise of [T]itle [I of the ADA]
is that persons with [mental and physical] disabilities should not be
excluded from job opportunities unless they are actually unable to do
the job.”122 Yet the ubiquity of disability stigma attached to “mental
impairment”—defined as “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder
such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities”123—continues to
undermine the power of this proclamation. One empirical study
determined that the primary barrier to workplace success for people
with mental or psychosocial disabilities is the employer’s
maintenance of the stigma of incapacity.124
Individuals with
intellectual, developmental, mental, or psychosocial disabilities are
“twice stigmatized” and subject to categorical labels as
“unpredictable, dangerous, irrational, slow, stupid, and unreliable,”125
perhaps the antithesis of an “ideal” worker. These stereotypes guide
an employer’s use of and reliance on affirmative defenses built into
the ADA such as her ability to exclude employees or potential
employees if they pose a safety risk—“direct threat”126—to others in

120. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. H.R. REP. NO. 10185, pt. 3, at 31 (1990). Former Executive Director of the
Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Leonard S. Rubinstein, described the ADA as
carrying “a lot of freight for people with psychiatric disabilities, seeking nothing less
than to transform a world that is not quite ready for it.” Teresa L. Scheid, Stigma as a
Barrier to Employment: Mental Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 28 INT’L
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 670, 671 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. H.R. REP. NO. 10185, at 31.
123. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2014); see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
§ 3(2) (including “mental impairment[s] that substantially limit[] one or more . . .
major life activities” within the definition of “disability”).
124. Scheid, supra note 121, at 672–74.
125. Id. at 673.
126. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 101 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the workplace or to deny a request for an accommodation as
“[un]reasonable”127 and burdensome in the mental disability context.
Similarly, indiscriminate views about capacity, competence, and
productivity affect judicial interpretations of the ADA.128
For
example, one court held that a person with a mental disability was
“unqualified” for a job because his behavior (speaking “too loudly”)
did not conform to social norms of his workplace, a grocery store.129
“Judges cannot understand that an individual can be simultaneously
employed and have a major psychiatric diagnosis because few
employed people with major psychiatric diagnoses have ever felt safe
letting the world know who they are.”130
In addition, nondisabled people may perceive accommodations as
a form of affirmative action or subsidies in the workplace and resent
people with actual or perceived disabilities for what seems like an
imposition of greater responsibilities (and workloads) on them.
Consider, for example, your friend John in the office down the hall
(who, like you, has worked for the company for fifteen years). John
tells you one day over lunch that human resources approved his
request for flextime, with fewer hours, based on his disability. You
respond that you did not know he was disabled, to which John, who
wants to downplay his psychosocial disability because of the associated
stigma, replies, “I’m not really, just sometimes.” In your experience,
John does not fit the description or image of a person with a
disability, so you process his accommodation as unnecessary,
undeserved, and exploitative of the system.131 These views strain not

127. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12112 (2012) (defining “reasonable[ness]” of
accommodation and whether it imposes “undue hardship” on the employer (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
128. See SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 5 (2002) (“Paradoxically, as social science research
and individual accounts teach us more about the nature of discrimination against
people with psychiatric disabilities, the law is being developed and interpreted in a
way that is contrary to those teachings—a way that ultimately provides little or no
protection against discrimination.”).
129. Taylor v. Food World, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 937, 942 (N.D. Ala. 1996), rev’d, 133
F.3d 1419 (11th Cir. 1998).
130. STEFAN, supra note 128, at xiv. See generally ELYN R. SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT
HOLD: MY JOURNEY THROUGH MADNESS (2007) (chronicling Professor Saks’s struggles
to balance schizophrenia with her career and personal ambitions).
131. The media exacerbates the perception of people exploiting ADA protections
like it does in the context of social security benefits, reinforcing a fear of “gaming”
and “undeserving” people who extort the system for personal gain. See, e.g., Nate
Rott, Under Calif. Law with Teeth, Big-Time Lawsuits Hit Small Businesses, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Apr. 23, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/04/23/306238454/
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only your personal but also your work relationship with John. Other
forms of documented backlash to the ADA include that of judges who
interpreted the ADA during its first eighteen years in a more
restrictive manner than Congress intended—a reflection, according
to some legal scholars, of attitudes about disability and the capacity of
people with disabilities (particularly those with mental disabilities).132
3. Disability as private medical information versus a celebrated
component of identity
Third, the ADA advances conflicting theories of disability.
Although congressional findings rhetorically challenged the medical
model of disability as generative of disability itself, other ADA
provisions have undercut this important conceptual move.
Antidiscrimination law focuses on preventing and policing
discriminatory behavior, which may require, when possible, the
suppression and nondisclosure of potentially stigmatizing information.
However, this tactic of suppression and nondisclosure of information
conflicts with an antistigma agenda that depends on the production
and dissemination of information as the means to shift social norms.
While professing the need for a social model133 of disability, the ADA

under-calif-law-with-teeth-big-time-lawsuits-hit-small-businesses (“Some California
lawyers and litigants have created a cottage industry around the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Some plaintiffs file hundreds of complaints a year, collecting a
living off small businesses that aren’t compliant with the ADA. Small business
advocates and community leaders say they focus on minority businesses because they
make for easier targets.”).
132. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model,
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 22 (2000) (discussing “judicial backlash” against the
ADA prior to the ADA amendments in 2008).
133. See, e.g., MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL
APPROACH 11 (1990) (suggesting a social theory of disability must follow from “the
experience of disabled people themselves and their attempts . . . to construct a
political movement amongst themselves”); MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING
DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 30–31 (1996) (explaining the “social model”
and contrasting it with the historical construction of the “medical model” of
disability); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV.
397, 426–36 (2000) (noting that most disability rights activists have embraced “the
“social-relations approach” to difference, which “treats human differences as
constructed by, and residing in, social relationships” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch, Disability Beyond Stigma: Social Interaction,
Discrimination, and Activism, 44 J. SOC. ISSUES 3, 8–9 (1988) (describing a “common”
assumption that disability is solely a function of biology as leading to disability’s
acceptance uncritically “as an independent variable”); Harlan Hahn, Civil Rights for
Disabled Americans: The Foundations of a Political Agenda, in IMAGES OF THE DISABLED,
supra note 37, at 181, 183–84 (developing a case for the “sociopolitical
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also reinforces the association of disability with medical information
in need of protection from disclosure. For example, the ADA
prohibits an employer from inquiring about a person’s disability with
few exceptions134 at the interview stage, the offer stage, or while
employed.135 Consider Valerie, an employee with epilepsy, who works
at a company as a data analyst. At no point during her ten-year
tenure with the company did she reveal her disability to human
resources or anyone else for fear of stigma. There were, over the
years, a few times that Valerie took one to two weeks off to respond to
periods of crisis but she always labeled these “vacation days.” Lately,
the number of seizures she has experienced has increased and may
be affecting her job performance (she took several days off and
cannot enter data as quickly because of the side effects of a new
medication). She receives a memo to all employees about the
opportunities for accommodations and the process of requesting
them. Valerie notices that she must only reveal her disability and
provide proof (a doctor’s letter and medical records) to a designated
human resources coordinator. The fact that her disability is generally
invisible means that, assuming human resources complies with the
privacy requirements under the ADA and the federal Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), none of her
coworkers will ever know she identifies as a person with a disability.
Furthermore, the memo indicates that “privacy is of the utmost
importance to protect potentially embarrassing medical information”
from public consumption. This may, in fact, be a good thing given
the backlash discussed earlier. However, privacy can also perpetuate

understanding of disability” and demonstrating the advantages of this approach); see
also PAUL K. LONGMORE, WHY I BURNED MY BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS ON DISABILITY 10
(2003) (collecting essays as part of a search for a “usable past” for the disability rights
movement); cf. Tom Shakespeare & Nicholas Watson, The Social Model of Disability:
An Outdated Ideology?, 2 RES. SOC. SCI. & DISABILITY 9, 18 (2002) (critiquing the social
model of disability as being too subjective and not functionally useful).
134. Functional inquiries during the pre-offer stage are permissible if related to
the essential functions of a position—e.g., for a position at a warehouse that would
require heavy lifting, asking a job applicant if she has any limitations on her ability to
lift is allowed. See 42 § U.S.C. 12112(d)(2)(B) (2012).
135. Furthermore, the “reasonableness” of a particular request for workplace
accommodations under Title I turns on the degree to which the person with a
disability can adapt to existing workplace designs and not whether the workplace
designs can adjust expectations and designs to respond to differences. Id.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (utilizing an “undue hardship” test). As such, the ADA actually
advances an individual deficit model here as opposed to its professed adherence to a
social model of disability.
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the notion of disability as disease—something that must be hidden
for fear of shame and stigma.136 As a practical matter, privacy
requires Valerie to assimilate and adjust to existing norms and, without
disclosure, encourages her to “cover” her disability rather than redesign
existing norms to allow for and encourage her broader disclosure.137
C. The ADA’s Achilles Heel: Stigma
Congress designed the ADA to remedy the history of invisibility,
achieving significant expressive victories. Yet stigma is the ADA’s
greatest vulnerability. Is this a function of the ADA’s limited reach
or, more broadly, an inability of law to reach social stigma? Perhaps
it is a function of both. Social science reveals that stigma is unlikely
to decrease “naturally” without structured, well-designed interventions,
suggesting a role for legal rules and procedures. Social science
explanations for stigma can deepen our understanding of the role of
law in stigma’s formation and potential deconstruction.
1.

Social science explanations
Stigma arises during a social interaction when an individual’s
actual social identity—the attributes he or she actually possesses—
conflicts with society’s normative expectations138 of the attributes the
individual should possess—referred to as his or her “virtual social

136. See, e.g., Burris, supra note 24, at 183 (“[L]egal measures that protect people
from the enactment of stigma are often designed to facilitate concealment, or have
the effect of facilitating concealment and accommodation rather than supporting
and promoting resistance. Privacy is good, but it is also the source of chronic hidden
distress at the individual level and maintenance of shame and stigma socially.”).
137. Here, disabilities in the workplace (less visible ones) resemble the trajectory
of sexual orientation. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 819 (2002)
(framing covering as a form of discrimination and “coming out” as resistance
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
138. Attitudes towards disability range from overt hatred (particularly of people
with mental or psychosocial disabilities) to paternalism. This normative spectrum
has room for many more affective responses in between; perhaps the most notable is
ambivalence, a discomfort and distaste for disability offset by a deep sense of guilt.
Harlan Hahn has argued that social ambivalence is perhaps most clearly exemplified
by the ways in which people describe the historical segregation of people with
disabilities: inaccessible public accommodations are “architectural barriers rather
than instruments of segregation”; students with disabilities are “mainstream[ed]
rather than integrat[ed] or desegregat[ed]”; and releasing disabled persons from
restrictive confinement is “deinstitutionalization” or “independent living.” Harlan
Hahn, Civil Rights for Disabled Americans: The Foundation of a Political Agenda, in IMAGES
OF THE DISABLED, supra note 37, at 181, 195 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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identity.”139 The individual in possession of the stigmatized attribute,
known in social psychology as the “target” of stigma, is socially,
physically, and morally either “discredited” (if the mark is visible,
such as facial disfigurement) or “discreditable” (if the mark is less
visible, such as a psychosocial disability) on the basis of that
disfavored attribute.140 The stigmatizer (or “perceiver” in social
psychology) equates the presence of the mark with the target’s
inability to fulfill the “role requirements of social interaction.”141 The
target’s social identity becomes “spoiled” in the eyes of the perceiver.
Consequently, the perceiver discounts the target’s identity as a person
and relegates him to a different social status (“us” versus “them,” or
“in group” versus “out group”). Stigma, in turn, can manifest
implicitly as unconscious heuristics that shape everyday decisions or,
in the extreme, explicitly as overt discrimination. Thus, its danger
lies in its ability to discretely integrate into social structures and, over
time, to inconspicuously morph into accepted normative positions.142
Stigma is not only about affirmative exclusion but also about
unabashed neglect or failure to consider people with disabilities in
the design of public institutions. The final (but perhaps most
critical) element in the process of stigmatization is the existence of
power inequities between the perceiver and the target, without which
stigma loses its functionality (i.e., social control).143 This carries
particular salience in the disability context, where people with

139. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 2
(1963). Erving Goffman, a renowned sociologist, constructed the best-known (and
perhaps most widely cited) theory of stigma in 1963. Stigma, according to Goffman,
is the “relationship between [an] attribute and stereotype [about others possessing
that attribute]” that is deeply “discrediting” and reduces a person in the minds of
others “from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one.” Id. at 2–4.
140. Id. at 4. Stigma takes shape at both the personal and public levels based on
the interaction of several variables that inform the social exchange between the
target and perceiver in the public arena. Three central variables in the context of
disability are visibility, threat, and responsibility. The interaction of these factors
determines both the target’s and the perceiver’s level of awareness of the mark, its
relevance, and the extent to which the perceiver will treat the target as deviant on
the basis of the mark. Id.
141. Robert Kurzban & Mark R. Leary, Evolutionary Origins of Stigmatization: The
Functions of Social Exclusion, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 187, 187 (2001).
142. Scott Burris, Stigma and the Law, 367 LANCET 529, 530 (2006) (“Structural
discrimination and self-stigmatisation are extremely powerful forces, not covered
by law.”).
143. Bruce G. Link & Jo C. Phelan, On Stigma and Its Public Health Implications,
NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://www.stigmaconference.nih.gov/FinalLinkPaper.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2015).

HARRIS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

PROCESSING DISABILITY

4/20/2015 8:00 PM

491

disabilities are among the most disenfranchised, poor, and highly
disaggregated sociopolitical groups.
I focus here on two models of stigma advanced by social scientists:
individual stigma (self-stigma) and public stigma.144 The public
model, discussed above, includes cognitive identification and
labeling of human differences (e.g., “that man is talking to himself
and pacing; he might be mentally ill”); the connection of marked
individuals to socially undesirable characteristics rooted in shared
cultural stereotypes of an “in group” (e.g., “he is unstable and
perhaps dangerous”); and eventual categorization and separation of
the labeled person into an “out group,” resulting in loss of social
status, exclusion, and discrimination (e.g., “I need to cross the street
to avoid him”).145
At the individual level, stigmatization begins with self-identification
of differences relative to culturally accepted norms, such as beauty,
intelligence, or functioning. Medical diagnoses can also trigger the
stigmatization process for the individual who now has a socially
recognized label for a discredited difference. The individual then
(consciously or unconsciously) accepts or rejects the stigma attached
to the attribute.146 “[B]oth perceived- and self-stigma result in losses
of self-esteem and self-efficacy,” thus limiting life opportunities
(employment, relationships, health care, and treatment) and
144. Bruce G. Link & Jo C. Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 363,
366–67 (2001).
145. Id. at 367 (“Thus, we apply the term stigma when elements of labeling,
stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination co-occur in a power situation
that allows the components of stigma to unfold.”). Recent empirical studies based
on Implicit Association Tests of disability suggest certain correlations among negative
implicit biases about disability and an individual’s beliefs about the controllability of
her future, sensitivity to the concept of disease, and degree of contact with
individuals with disabilities. In the context of physical disabilities, people who
reported prior experiences of integrated education exhibited relatively less implicit
bias than those with less notable prior contact with people with disabilities, those
with less fate control manifested heightened existential fears about physical
disabilities when exposed to a mark of physical disability (such as a wheelchair or
facial disfigurement), and, overall, people expressed clear preferences for
nondisabled people. Michelle Clare Wilson & Katrina Scior, Attitudes Towards
Individuals with Disabilities as Measured by the Implicit Association Test: A Literature
Review, 35 RES. DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 294, 314–15 (2014) (citations omitted).
146. See, e.g., Jennifer Crocker & Brenda Major, Social Stigma and Self-Esteem: The
Self-Protective Properties of Stigma, 96 PSYCHOL. REV. 608, 610 (1989) (discussing
“reflected appraisals” in the development of self-concept (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Brenda Major & Laurie T. O’Brien, The Social Psychology of Stigma, 56 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 393, 396 (2005) (discussing expectancy confirmation processes, or
“self-fulfilling prophecies”).
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opportunities for recovery.147 The target faces the possibility of
discrimination or exclusion in any social interaction and uncertainty
about whether the outcomes of social interactions reflect “personal
deservingness or . . . social prejudices” (known as “attributional
ambiguity”).148 Acceptance of stigmas based on less visible marks can
lead to social concealment of disability, self-exclusion, selfdiscrimination, and social avoidance to protect one’s ability to “pass”
or “cover” disability.149 Targets can use disclosure, on the other hand,
as a form of stigma resistance. Empirically (and, to some, counterintuitively), social science reveals the significant health, economic,
and social benefits of disclosure, as compared to the concealment of
a stigmatized identity.150
2.

The relationship between law and stigma
The ability of the ADA, post-2008 amendments, to serve as a
prophylaxis or remedy for stigma that manifests in overt violence or
discrimination remains an open question, the answer to which will
take shape in emerging jurisprudence. Historically, disability laws
have largely constructed or perpetuated the stigma of disability.151
Socio-economic distance, as a practical matter, has prevented people
with disabilities from challenging social stigmas through integrated
contact, the accumulation of wealth, and standing as a major political
interest group. In addition, the expressive value of the laws of invisibility
placed state stamps of legitimacy (and legality) on concealment,
separation, and social distance as acceptable (and justifiable) social
responses to disability. William Eskridge, in the context of sexual
orientation, argues that the law itself—through constructing legal
definitions of what it means to be gay—helped to create and perpetuate

147. Patrick W. Corrigan et al., The Stigma of Mental Illness: Explanatory Models and
Methods for Change, 11 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 179, 180 (2005).
148. Brenda Major et al., Antecedents and Consequences of Attributions to
Discrimination: Theoretical and Empirical Advances, 34 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 251, 258 (2002).
149. Burris, supra note 24, at 181.
150. See, e.g., Patrick Corrigan & Alicia K. Matthews, Stigma and Disclosure:
Implications for Coming Out of the Closet, 12 J. MENTAL HEALTH 235, 235 (2003)
(discussing how members of the general public’s contact with people with mental illness
correlates with their diminished prejudicial attitudes and discriminating behaviors).
151. See Burris, supra note 142, at 530 (noting the law’s role in constructing stigma
in the HIV/AIDS context through prohibitions on service in the armed forces and,
in the context of epilepsy, through prohibitions on obtaining a driver’s license). Burris
also discusses (and questions) the intentional use of “good stigma” in public health
to regulate and deter poor health decisions, such as smoking in public places. Id.
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stigmas of homosexuality precisely through atomistic reduction of gays
to a singular social identity—that of sexual orientation.152 Arguably, the
act of constructing a legal definition of disability may itself perpetuate
the salience of the mark even where, as in the ADA, such
categorization intends to remedy discrimination. The expressive
value of the category signifies that the mark, at least in some contexts,
remains salient, useful, and legitimate, undercutting efforts to
produce normative change.153
The target of disability stigma can also internalize social norms
expressed in laws as legitimate statements of public perceptions and
social valuation. Harm to identity and self-esteem are hardly benign
when they can shape one’s interpretation of interactions as selffailures or discriminatory acts and one’s willingness, in the case of
discrimination, to seek remedies. It is in this space where rights
consciousness meets the development and evolution of legal claims
and legal narratives to advance those claims.154
Broad consensus exists among scholars of antidiscrimination law
(primarily in the race and sex arenas) that existing legal frameworks
are ill-suited to redress implicit bias and stigma that operate largely
outside of the consciousness,155 as opposed to conduct and

152. See Eskridge, supra note 24, at 1334–35 (analogizing the law’s role in
stigmatizing race with the role of the “law’s stigma [in helping] create homosexuality
as a totalizing and naturalized identity trait”).
153. See Burris, supra note 24, at 183 (explaining how “legal measures that protect
people from the enactment of stigma” often “have the effect of facilitating
concealment and accommodation rather than supporting and promoting
resistance”). For example, social welfare legislation has historically played that
role by defining disability in terms of medical diagnoses or functional limitations
while categorically excluding those without such legal classifications from receiving
assistance. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1) (2012) (“‘[D]isability’ means—(A) inability
to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months . . . .”).
154. See Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights
Litigation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 247, 251 (discussing the initial interview with a lawyer or
advocate as an example of a key moment in narrative evolution where the client, in
the disability context, must claim the label of disability).
155. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 22 (2006) (suggesting that although some
courts have scrutinized whether an employer’s subjective employment practices
contain “sufficient procedural safeguards to limit the possibility of bias,” the judicial
system for the most part has reluctantly scrutinized workplace structures that impede
equality); Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation
and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 753 (2001) (discussing not only disparate
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intentional acts of discrimination that produced the Civil Rights Act
and cases such as Washington v. Davis.156 Implicit bias manifests in
unconscious behavior, an unsettling proposition for proponents of
the law as a means to regulate and promote rational (i.e., conscious)
behavior.157 Although scholars agree that the remedy does not fit the

treatment and disparate impact, but also other forms of bias that have not been
theorized in law and are often unintentional and unconscious); Christine Jolls,
Antidiscrimination Law’s Effects on Implicit Bias, in 3 NYU SELECTED ESSAYS ON LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW: BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES OF WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION 69, 86 (Mitu
Gulati & Michael J. Yelnosky eds., 2007) (describing the gap between advances in
social science in the area of implicit bias and antidiscrimination law’s lack of
response as a “highly dangerous” combination); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content
of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (1995) (disputing the argument under
existing models that biased employment decisions result from discrimination and
suggesting instead that they arise from “judgment errors”); Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317, 322 (1987) (“[T]he Court thinks of facially neutral actions as either
intentionally and unconstitutionally or unintentionally and constitutionally
discriminatory . . . . [T]his is a false dichotomy.”); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the
Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 803 (2004) (arguing
that racial stigma, rather than intentional discrimination as suggested by Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence, cases racial injury in the U.S.); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva la
Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
415, 415 (2000) (suggesting that the legal community should focus on more than the
“intent” to discriminate in assessing whether someone has violated an employment
discrimination law); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving
Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1139 (1997) (positing that
courts now use the “discriminatory purpose” doctrine outlined in Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), to “justify a decision to uphold
facially neutral state action that has a disparate impact on protected classes”);
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001) (“Cognitive bias, structures of decisionmaking, and
patterns of interaction have replaced deliberate racism and sexism as the frontier
of much continued inequality.”).
156. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that “a law or other official act, without
regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is [not]
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact”).
157. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1551 (1998) (supporting rational choice economics, which is
broadly defined as choosing “the means that achieves . . . the greatest margin of
benefit over cost”); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The
Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV.
1893, 1956 (2009) (questioning empirical data that purports to upset the law’s
deterrent effect); Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN. L.
REV. 979, 1004–05 (2008) (challenging the importance of implicit bias theories
because of their use of, and reliance on, weak causal connections to explain
discriminatory behavior). But see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and
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harm, they disagree as to the appropriate legal interventions.158
Despite their concerns, scholars recognize the continued utility of
antidiscrimination laws in addressing conscious, overt acts of
discrimination but not social stigma directly.159
III. OPEN PROCEEDINGS AS ANTISTIGMA AGENTS
Procedural design offers agency-enhancing possibilities to bring
disability out of the shadows. Adjudication mirrors and gives
meaning to our public values160 and rights through a facilitated,
contextualized conversation with litigants and the public about both
localized and national cultural norms.161
Transparency,162

Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 479–80 (2007) (defending the
utility of the implicit bias theory in antidiscrimination law despite its causal
limitations expressed by naysayers).
158. Antidiscrimination scholarship diverges with respect to proposed solutions.
See Lawrence, supra note 155, at 324–25 (advancing a “cultural meaning” test of an
alleged discriminatory act by which judges can determine whether implicit biases are
at work and thereby apply strict scrutiny (internal quotation marks omitted)).
However, scholars commonly focus on either substantive reforms of
antidiscrimination laws or particular methods of (or frameworks for) judicial
interpretation in equal protection and/or antidiscrimination statutes. The particular
points of divergence are beyond the scope of this Article. I argue here that
antidiscrimination scholars have not focused on the normative potential of
procedure to remedy implicit biases and stigma. My theory of antistigma agency
complements these existing proposals.
159. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 76, at 493 (noting that like other discrimination laws,
the employment “antidiscrimination rules are highly beneficial to some members of
the protected class, but not to all”).
160. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms of Justice,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979) (“Adjudication is the social process by which judges give
meaning to our public values.”).
161. Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate:
Relationships,
Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 306 (1996) (discussing the value of early
court-based procedure to “enacting rights” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
162. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Man being what he is cannot safely be trusted
with complete immunity from outward responsibility in depriving others of their
rights. At least such is the conviction underlying our Bill of Rights. That a
conclusion satisfies one’s private conscience does not attest its reliability. The validity
and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the mode by which it was
reached. Secrecy is not congenial to truth seeking and self-righteousness gives too
slender an assurance of rightness. No better instrument has been devised for
arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for generating
the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done.”).
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“accuracy,”163 accountability, publicity,164 effectuation,165 finality,
economy, democratic, and legal institutional legitimacy166 sit atop the
list of values of procedure. For example, Tom Tyler’s empirical work
reveals the importance of procedural fairness in dispute resolution
and in assessments of democratic legitimacy.167 Tyler’s research suggests
that disputants focus on at least three underlying values of procedure
in shaping their perceptions of fairness: the opportunity to participate,
treatment with dignity, and litigants’ trust in the adjudicator.168

163. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 130–32 (1988) (discussing Leventhal’s theory of procedural
justice’s “six general procedural justice rules”: consistency, bias suppression,
accuracy of information, correctability, representativeness, and ethicality); see also
Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil
Commitment Hearings, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS FOR THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE 3, 7 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996) [hereinafter
Tyler, Psychological Consequences] (“[P]eople are affected by the way in which decisions
are made, irrespective of what those decisions are.”).
164. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: FIRST
PRINCIPLES PREPARATORY TO CONSTITUTIONAL CODE 56 (Philip Schofield ed., 1989)
(explaining that publicizing a tribunal’s decision and underlying rationale are a
counterforce to official power); see also 6 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 355 (John Bowring ed., 1843) (“Without publicity, all other checks are
insufficient: in comparison with publicity, all other checks are of small account.”).
165. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One’s Rights—Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1173 (“Effectuation values see
litigation as an important means through which persons are enabled to get, or are
given assurance of having, whatever we are pleased to regard as rightfully theirs.”).
166. See JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION,
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 289 (2011)
(“Because the public processes of adjudication undermined status hierarchies . . .
adjudication served as one paradigm for responsible, popularly responsive, and
hence democratic governance.”).
167. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation,
57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 376 (2006) (discussing “legitimacy—the belief that
authorities, institutions, and social arrangements are appropriate, proper, and just”);
Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of
Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 115 (1988) (expanding the focus of
procedural fairness tests to include, in addition to formal trials, citizen contact with
police and other nondisputes); see also JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER,
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 67–68 (1975) (noting that both
disputants and members of the public sitting in a gallery are often concerned with
the fairness of the processes as much as the outcomes themselves); Carrie MenkelMeadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31
UCLA L. REV. 754, 758 (1984) (advocating for the use of a “problem-solving” model
of negotiation over the traditional adversarial model).
168. Tyler, Psychological Consequences, supra note 162, at 7.
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While federal and state court jurisprudence tend to focus more on
utilitarian values,169 procedural justice scholars routinely assert—in
addition to and not as a replacement for—underlying values of
individual dignity and voice, autonomy, participation,170 and the
cathartic interests171 of disputants. Most pertinent to this discussion,
autonomy—the vesting of decision making authority in individual
disputants—is a distinct value from opportunities for persuasion,
memorialized by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly172 as an
“opportunity to be heard.”173 In this respect, due process values
extend beyond the individual to the public more broadly.174
A. A Primer on Open Proceedings
Twenty-five years later, therefore, institutional designers may
benefit from a different interpretive and evaluative lens, one
specifically designed to address a central but unfulfilled goal of the

169. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (privileging efficacy
values, i.e., risk of an erroneous result, over others in the balance of interests). But
see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–66 (1970) (discussing the potential
psychological harms to welfare recipients’ dignity and self-esteem as a result of a
failure to provide a pre-deprivation hearing); cf. Tyler, Psychological Consequences,
supra note 162, at 3 (noting that literature evaluating the adequacy of judicial
hearings and procedures “typically focuses on issues such as bias, honesty, and
expertise,” which are “regarded as important because they are believed to influence
the ability of a procedure to reach an objectively correct outcome”).
170. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 28, 49–50 (1976) (“State coercion must be legitimized, not only by
acceptable substantive policies, but also by political processes that respond to a
democratic morality’s demand for participation in decisions affecting individual
and group interests.”).
171. See Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POL’Y, & L. 184, 185 (1997) (“Therapeutic jurisprudence proposes the
exploration of ways in which, consistent with principles of justice . . . , the knowledge,
theories, and insights of the mental health and related disciplines can help shape the
development of the law.”).
172. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
173. Id. at 267 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
174. Bankruptcy proceedings demonstrate the use of open proceedings as an
affirmative tool for combating stigmatization. Public examination had been
regarded as one of the most important aspects of the bankruptcy process because it
was intended to serve public policy by permitting the public to gather as much
information as possible about the debtor and his affairs. See, e.g., Sexton v. Dreyfus,
219 U.S. 339, 344–46 (1911) (tracing the roots of American bankruptcy law to
English law in 1869); see also In re Astri Inv., Mgmt. & Sec. Corp., 88 B.R. 730, 737 (D.
Md. 1988) (describing the American importation of the procedural tradition of
openness to allow creditors to publicly examine debtors).
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ADA: antistigma agency, or the law’s ability to support the agency and
dignity of people with disabilities. Public adjudication is a wellestablished element of procedural design that is historically
understood to promote the underlying values of individual autonomy
and public accountability. Arguments advancing open access to
adjudication most focused on the work of political philosopher
Jeremy Bentham emphasize the “publicity” values of open access—
that is, public education about the judicial process and government
functionality.175 Bentham identified disability as an area where blanket
public access may not advance underlying procedural values; however,
he applied an indiscriminate categorical exclusion of disability from
our normative tradition of openness without due consideration.
This Article contends that a more nuanced evaluation of disability
proceedings may yield significant gains for advancing agency by
opening the discursive space, in some cases, to the creation and
dissemination of information about disability. Most scholars use
Bentham’s highly utilitarian values of open proceedings as a point of
reference for analysis. Judith Resnik, for example, argues that even if
Bentham overstates the educative value of proceedings, public
adjudication can be norm generative. Over time, and through
interactions among adjudicators, disputants, and the public, “the polity
develops, learns about, and changes the norms that govern disputes.”176
Federal and state jurisprudence, more generally, supports
presumptive open proceedings on the basis of the long and tested
history177 of public access to adjudication rooted in English common
law178 and, implicitly, in constitutional law.179 The Supreme Court of
175. See supra note 164 (discussing the works of Jeremy Bentham); see also
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 597 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“Popular attendance at trials, in sum, substantially furthers the
particular public purposes of that critical judicial proceeding. In that sense, public
access is an indispensable element of the trial process itself.” (footnote omitted)).
176. Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. F LA . L. R EV . 405,
417 (1987).
177. But see id. at 410–11 (questioning the Supreme Court’s untested empirical
claim that history proves the existence of open courts).
178. See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122
YALE L.J. 522, 526–27 (2012) (“The main features of the Anglo-American civil trial
developed in the practice of the English common law courts . . . as a consequence of
the jury system . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
179. The Supreme Court has explicitly determined that the public and press hold
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of access to criminal proceedings (including
grand jury and evidentiary hearings) in furtherance of the public accountability,
transparency, cathartic, and education goals. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448
U.S. at 591 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“This Court too has persistently defended the
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the United States has not directly addressed the question of the
public’s constitutional right of access to civil proceedings.180 The
strong presumption of openness requires a showing that “closure is
essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.”181 Such higher values tend to focus on the privacy
interests of the parties—for example, national security, disability,
divorce, child protection, and trade secrets.
While such a
presumption does not exist in the administrative arena, the more
“trial-like” an agency proceeding, the more willing courts are to hold
that a right of public access exists.182
The question here is not whether the public has a right
(constitutional or otherwise) to attend any or all disability
proceedings; in fact, given the association between disability and
privacy and the history of disability adjudication as presumptively
closed, it is unlikely that courts doctrinally would find the “logic” or
“experience” necessary to grant public access without greater
disability consciousness of the type advanced in this Article.183

public character of the trial process.”). English law did not distinguish between
criminal and civil trials; instead, “all causes [were] heard . . . openly in the kings
courts.” 1 EDWARDO COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 103 (1797).
180. See, e.g., NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337,
351 n.13, 358–59 (Cal. 1999) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the
public has a First Amendment right of access in criminal proceedings, but the Court
has suggested that the right is not only limited to criminal proceedings and has not
reviewed any lower court cases that do find a right of access to civil proceedings).
181. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510
(1984) (emphasis added).
182. See, e.g., Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 518 (3d Cir.
2013) (extending the First Amendment right of public access to adjudication to
arbitration proceedings “conducted before active judges in a courthouse, because
they result in a binding order of the Chancery Court, and because they allow only a
limited right of appeal”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014); N.Y. Civil Liberties
Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 290 (2d Cir. 2011) (extending the First
Amendment right of public access to adjudication to state administrative
proceedings because “access . . . does not depend on which branch of government
houses that proceeding”).
183. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1,
8–9 (1986) (establishing a two part “experience and logic” analysis to determine the
public’s right of access: (1) “experience,” whether “the place and process have
historically been open to the press and general public,” and (2) logic, whether
“public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular
process in question”); see also Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra note 1, at 1816
(“Because [the experience and logic] test is contingent rather than rights-based,
‘experience’ can change the ‘logic’ of what needs to be open. As the Federal Rules

HARRIS.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

500

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

4/20/2015 8:00 PM

[Vol. 64:457

Rather, I undertake a broader conceptual project here: that of
constructing and advancing antistigma agency as an unexplored,
transcontextual value of open proceedings. This Article posits that
institutional designers should consider the value of antistigma agency
in the disability context—particularly, open proceedings as
antistigma agents—not that open proceedings in the disability
context are constitutionally required per se or should be open
without qualification.
B. Theory of Antistigma Agency
I propose new interpretive and prescriptive considerations—what I
call “antistigma agents”—to focus institutional designers on the
advancement of agency, autonomy, and dignity values. An antistigma
agent is a process, rule, standard, or procedure that creates an
opportunity for normative transformation of stigma by structuring
the public performance of marked social identities.184 The process or
instrument can mitigate stigma by offering the structures to facilitate
a demonstration, dissemination, or communication of the dignity
and agency of a person or group in possession of a stigmatized mark.
Antistigma agency implicates process autonomy for both the target
and perceiver. That is, having control of the process of dispute
resolution (or being perceived as such) both enables and reflects
agency and capacity.185 Much of the social science literature on
prejudice and discrimination focuses on the perceiver as the actor

and ADR reshape ‘experiences,’ they alter the ‘logic’ of what courts are about and
when openness is therefore protected.”).
184. Because my focus here is on marks of disability, I do not consider the
intersectionality of marked identities—e.g., a black female with a psychosocial
disorder—that complicates the processes of identity performance as well as
management/mitigation of the marks. For discussions regarding the challenges of
intersectionality to identity politics in critical race theory, see Kimberle Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:
A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
139, 139 (dissecting black women’s experiences in employment “to contrast the
multidimensionality of [b]lack women’s experience with the single-axis analysis that
distorts these experiences”); Addrain S. Conyers, Manifold Deviants: Labeling and
Identity Management Among Persons Possessing Multiple Spoiled Identities (June
29, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Illinois University Carbondale)
(focusing on individuals’ multiple “spoiled entities” to expand the current research,
which is often limited to one spoiled entity).
185. Gerald S. Leventhal, What Should Be Done with Equity Theory? New Approaches to
the Study of Fairness in Social Relationships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE: ADVANCES IN THEORY
AND RESEARCH 27, 43, 45 (Kenneth J. Gergen et al. eds., 1980) (distinguishing
between process and decisional control).
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and the target as a passive recipient. An antistigma agency analysis, in
contrast, positions the target at the center of the inquiry as well as the
remedial focal point. The person with a disability accomplishes this
by participating in a process that increases the salience of the
stigmatized mark but changes its valence, if not more broadly, at least
to the individual. The net effect potentially mitigates self-stigma and
can generate information about disability in a public setting.
Prescriptively, institutional and legislative designers seeking to
advance underlying values of agency and dignity may consider, for
example, (1) the expressed goals of the process or adjudicative
proceeding and how the goals of the process or procedure relate to
the agency and/or dignity of the person in possession of a
stigmatized mark; (2) other underlying values driving or potentially
driving the goals that exist for the designers, the public, and the
disputants; (3) the substantive laws and legal elements governing
outcomes that may advance or suppress the agency and dignity of the
person with a stigmatized mark; (4) the social identities of the legal
actors that may be in possession of known or expected186 stigmatized
marks; (5) the public’s interests in the process or proceeding; (6) the
extent to which existing procedures have the potential to enhance or
reduce agency and dignity of the person with a stigmatized social
identity; and (7) the weight and balance of procedural goals at stake
to institutional designers and their considerations and possibilities.
This analysis can be incorporated into any due process design, but
the weight given to agency and autonomy may vary depending on the
answers to the previously listed considerations. For those matters
where the potential antistigma agency is high (i.e., when the
substantive law explicitly addresses the stigmatized mark) procedural
designers may choose to advance autonomy and dignity over other
competing interests such as, perhaps, process efficacy or costs.
Antistigma agency operates through procedural participation and
the creation of diverse narratives of disability. Stigma turns on shared
cultural knowledge and information about differences. Procedures
offer structured opportunities to solve the collective information
problem that perpetuates the negative stereotypes that underlie
stigma. For example, under an attitudinal theory of expressive law,

186. For example, people of color who possess what Goffman calls “tribal stigma”
are disproportionately affected by social welfare laws, and, thus, any process related
to their substantive entitlements will likely disproportionately implicate and affect
them. See GOFFMAN, supra note 139, at 4–5 (describing three types of expected
stigmas, including tribal stigmas of race, nation, and religion).
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people are motivated by societal approval either for its own sake or
for another purpose.187 But individuals have imperfect information
about social norms and often carry and share misinformation.188
According to Richard McAdams, because people innately seek social
approval, “individuals are . . . sensitive to new sources of information.”189
Procedural rules can shape the creation and quality of information
about people with disabilities. The process generates or facilitates
the production of disconfirming evidence about the mark.190 The
fundamental belief driving the formation and persistence of social
stigma is that the stigmatized mark makes the person in possession
less than human. These opportunities to enhance agency can also
produce alternative narratives about the dignity and autonomy of
people with disabilities.
The use and effectiveness of open proceedings to mitigate
disability stigma requires attention to context. I argue here that
blanket presumptions of closure as well as de facto practices of
closure mask the gradations of agency and competency of people
more broadly and apply, more specifically, to people with disabilities
precisely because of the historic invisibility of disability.
A
presumption of openness in disability adjudication, from a design
perspective, can be a default position aligned with broader

187. Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV.
339, 340–41 (2000).
188. Id. at 340.
189. Id. McAdams advances a third component of attitudinal theory where he
suggests that laws provide information to people about societal expectations and can
cause people to update prior views based on the absence of data or misinformation.
Id. Under this theory, the ADA’s expressive law effect may continue to unfold. See,
e.g., Michael Ashley Stein, Under the Empirical Radar: An Initial Expressive Law Analysis
of the ADA, 90 VA. L. REV. 1151, 1154–55, 1191 (2004) (reviewing DAVID M. ENGEL &
FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003)).
190. See Eva Jonas et al., Confirmation Bias in Sequential Information Search After
Preliminary Decisions: An Expansion of Dissonance Theoretical Research on Selective
Exposure to Information, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 557, 557 (2001)
(referring to “confirmation bias” as information and processes that lead a person
to search for information to confirm rather than to challenge his or her existing
beliefs). Social scientists have identified a number of variables in managing
confirmation biases and cognitive dissonance, including the sequence of
presenting the information, the stated focus of the information inquiry, and/or
the sharing process. Id. at 569–70. For example, focusing decision makers on the
source and persuasiveness of the information rather than on the ultimate question
can mitigate confirmation biases. Id. at 570.
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adjudicative norms (at least historically). With this as a starting point,
the degree of openness can potentially exist on a continuum.
C. Contextualizing Public Access to Disability Adjudication
I situate my thesis in the current debate regarding the values of
open proceedings and the “new private process”—that is, the
increasing reliance on alternative public and private dispute
resolution mechanisms.191 I recognize this discussion about open
proceedings comes at a critical moment regarding the future of
public adjudication and may seem to push against the evolving norm
in this area. It is precisely because we are moving at increasing speed
towards less public and less structured forms of adjudication that I
wish to stop and consider the effects of this movement in particular
on people with disabilities and the evolution of a public disability
consciousness. This shift from court-based, adversarial192 adjudication
in public spaces to less formal, private dispute resolution has never
existed in the disability law context. From its onset, disability
adjudication has occurred in presumptively or effectively private
spaces,193 cloaked in a protective cape by the state and marked as an
“exception” to the well-established norm of public adjudication. This
choice of design, combined with a history of invisibility, created a
void in public consciousness about disability more generally but also
about the appropriate procedural values to guide disability adjudication.
Without greater public participation in disability adjudication and
opportunities to observe the administration of justice, there is a
normative baseline for public debate to drive substantive or
procedural reforms.

191. See Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra note 1, at 1802–14 (detailing the
historical development towards the various forms of alternative dispute resolution
that constitute the “[n]ew [p]rivate [p]rocess”).
192. Courts have discussed the difference between an “adversarial” proceeding
and, by exclusion, a non-adversarial one. See, e.g., Pardo v. Gen. Hosp. Corp., No.
98174, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 377, at *13–14 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 30, 2001)
(noting that evaluating procedural elements associated with non-adversarial
proceedings such as “the closed nature of the proceeding, its focus on education and
improvement as opposed to punishment, and the insistence on confidentiality” may
suggest whether the proceeding is adversarial), aff’d, 841 N.E.2d 692 (Mass. 2006).
193. Exceptions include cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
all of which typically take place in open court.
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D. Civil Proceedings in State Courts
Guardianship and civil commitment present two of the strongest
cases for consideration of antistigma agency, as they directly implicate
the liberty and dignity interests of the respondents. Although these
proceedings tend to focus on people with intellectual, developmental,
mental, or psychosocial disabilities (particularly in civil commitment),
guardianship proceedings touch people with a broad range of
disabilities, including epilepsy, dementia, mobility impairments,
blindness, and deafness.
States have selected primarily more
traditional adjudicatory fora to hear arguments regarding these grave
liberty deprivations—state courts before state court judges. Adjudicative
proceedings in state courts have a significant presumption of
openness to overcome, particularly given the public’s interest in the
treatment of its citizens when questions of agency arise. However,
with few exceptions, privacy considerations have de jure or de facto
subsumed the public’s interests in accessing these proceedings and the
respondents’ interests in visibility and autonomy.194
1.

Adult guardianship
Approximately twenty percent of states have statutorily closed adult
guardianship proceedings.195 These proceedings take place in
otherwise publicly accessible state courthouses among presumptively

194. The Supreme Court of the United States has not directly addressed the
question of the public’s constitutional right of access to civil proceedings, but having
a First Amendment right to access in civil proceedings may be implied. See, e.g., NBC
Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc., v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 351 n.13, 358–59 (Cal.
1999) (noting that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the public
has a First Amendment right of access in criminal proceedings, but the Court has
suggested that the right is not limited to criminal proceedings and has not reviewed
any lower court cases that do find a right of access to civil proceedings). The strong
presumption of openness requires a showing that “closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (emphasis added). Such
higher values tend to focus on the privacy interests of the parties—for example,
national security, disability, divorce, child protection, and trade secrets.
195. A majority of states appear to presumptively close minor guardianship
proceedings. I conducted a fifty state review of guardianship states (authority over
the adult as opposed to conservatorship or minor guardianship proceedings). A
clear presumption of closure exists in the following states: Wisconsin, Alaska, West
Virginia, New Mexico, Washington, New Hampshire, and Alabama. See generally
JASMINE E. HARRIS, STATE-BY-STATE GUARDIANSHIP HEARING INFORMATION (2014) (on
file with author).
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open proceedings.196 For example, Wisconsin presumptively closes
guardianship proceedings, yet the public has a presumptive right to
access both the records and hearings regarding a contested will
irrespective of the personal and perhaps even salacious details about
historically protected persons.197
Although a slight majority of states have a textual presumption of
open guardianship proceedings,198 a disaggregated analysis highlights
the existence of additional procedures, rules, or practices that de
facto undermine the public’s access and the respondents’ autonomy.
For example, while some states rest the decision to grant public
access with the respondent, there are no procedures or rules
structuring the type and extent of information provided, method of
delivery (e.g., written or oral), or support offered to the respondent
in making this decision to open or close a proceeding.199 Other
qualifiers extend the decision to the respondent’s counsel or
guardian ad litem based on a “best interests” standard.200 By placing
the decision in the hands of the respondent, absent meaningful
opportunities to exercise that decision, as a practical matter, the
decision to open the proceeding may become a question of
convenience for counsel or one of legal strategy rather than a central
value of institutional design and due process. Other state statutes do
not specify closure but place the decision in the hands of the judge

196. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-405 (amended 2010) (“If a petition in a
testacy proceeding is unopposed, the court may . . . conduct a hearing in open court
and require proof of the matters necessary to support the order sought.” (emphasis
added)). Almost half of all states have adopted the Uniform Probate Code or
language substantially similar to it. UPC Enactment Chart, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/Probate%20Code/UPC%20Chart.pdf
(last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
197. Compare WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.44(5) (West 2014) (“Every hearing under this
chapter shall be closed . . . .”), with In re Estates of Zimmer, 442 N.W.2d 578, 581–85
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that Wisconsin gives the public the right to access
records of any court of law, including probate courts, even if the underlying
information concerns a minor).
198. Approximately twenty-eight states either do not specify an open or closed
proceeding, but their statutes can be read to set a presumption of openness as the
default in the absence of contrary language.
199. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.113(a) (2012) (“[R]espondent has the right
to . . . have the hearing open or closed to the public as the respondent elects . . . .”);
MO. REV. STAT. § 475.075(8) (2006) (“[R]espondent shall have . . . [t]he right to have
the hearing opened or closed to the public as he elects . . . .”).
200. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:8(VII) (2004) (“The issue as to whether a
guardian should be appointed . . . shall be determined by the court at a closed hearing
unless the proposed ward or counsel for the proposed ward otherwise requests.”).
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acting sua sponte in the “best interests” of the respondent or in the
respondent’s (or counsel’s) hands.201 A number of states with
presumptively open proceedings do not provide information to the
respondent to make an informed decision on whether to open or
close a hearing.202
In fact, most guardianship hearings proceed uncontested, with the
majority of guardians appointed without the respondent present.203
Consider the case of Jerry Chenoweth in Colorado.204 Chenoweth, a
person with psychosocial disabilities and HIV, expressed his wish to
leave his current residence in a nursing home for a more
independent setting. Staff at the home recognized Chenoweth’s
capacity to live in a less restrictive setting and the absence of any
impairment to competent decision making, but his doctors, who had
very little contact with him, disagreed and refused to authorize his
release. Chenoweth ultimately left the nursing home against medical
advice. Adult Protective Services (APS) petitioned for guardianship
over Mr. Chenoweth. APS described him as a danger to himself and
others, evidence of which was his departure from the nursing home
against medical advice. Although guardianship proceedings are
statutorily open in Colorado, and hence, could potentially offer
counter-narratives of disability, the judge granted APS’s petition
201. Kansas, although providing for a trial, places procedural designs completely
within the hands of the judge without enumerated guidance. See KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59067(d) (2005) (“The trial shall be conducted in as informal a manner as may be
consistent with orderly procedure.”).
202. As a practical matter, a petitioner files for guardianship with the court, and
most jurisdictions have some form of notice requirements to the respondent, but
nothing in the petitions or notice provides information to the respondents or
counsel of the rights to open or close proceedings or information that could help
the person make an informed decision. See RICHARD VAN DUIZEND & BRENDA K.
UEKERT, NAT’L COLL. OF PROBATE JUDGES, NATIONAL PROBATE COURT STANDARDS
3.3.1C–D, 3.37 (2013) (listing the standard requirements for a petition and notice of
guardianship proceedings).
203. See Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, Guardianship and the Elderly, in
HANDBOOK OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND AGING 528, 530–31 (Paul David Nussbaum ed.,
1997) (listing various issues with traditional guardianship adjudications that caused
most guardianship hearings to be uncontested). There is an open empirical
question regarding the perception of lawyers representing respondents regarding
any ethical duty to counsel their clients about this right and whether lawyers perceive
this as an affirmative due process protection or a benefit.
204. See Laura Hershey, Adult Protective Services vs. Jerry Chenoweth, RAGGED EDGE
ONLINE, http://www.raggededgemagazine.com/0701/0701feat1.htm (last updated
Aug. 2001) (discussing the ability of Victor Montoya, an adult protective services
worker, to obtain a court order that granted him and the county emergency
temporary guardianship of Chenoweth despite the lack of input from Chenoweth).
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without Mr. Chenoweth present.205 A procedural rule requiring the
respondent’s presence absent emergent circumstances may have
produced a different result if the judge had an opportunity to see and
hear Mr. Chenoweth in person.206
Although substantial differences exist among states with respect to
the specific design of due process procedures and protections
afforded respondents in guardianship proceedings, several common
procedural elements exist across jurisdictions—namely, the
requirements of (1) the filing of a formal petition seeking
guardianship; (2) notice to the respondent of petition and hearing;
(3) the appointment, recommendation for, or availability of counsel
for respondent;207 (4) a court-appointed independent guardian ad
litem and medical evaluator to assess the individual’s capacity and
make recommendations to the court; (5) a hearing and opportunity
to present testimony; (6) the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses;
(7) findings of fact and conclusions of law by the judge resulting in
appointment of a plenary or limited guardian or dismissal of the case;
and (8) the right to appeal.208
The history of guardianship offers a window into the choices of its
institutional designers. Guardianship proceedings are the modern
day remnants of the English legal tradition parens patriae—i.e., the
king or the state acting as the parent of the country and fiduciary of
the property of its citizens who were non compos mentis (not of sound
mind/incompetent).209 English common law and its American

205. See Hershey, supra note 204 (examining court documents, including
statements by officials that stated that Chenoweth was “being ill-advised by an
advocacy group,” and then concluding that Chenoweth “should remain in the
supervised, structured setting he is currently in until an appropriate care plan can be
implemented” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
206. Interestingly, the Chenoweth case unfolded less than two years after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). The
Court in Olmstead considered whether Georgia’s refusal to offer services to people
with mental disabilities in community settings (as opposed to institutions such as
hospitals) violated the ADA’s integration mandate.
The Court held that
“[u]njustified isolation . . . is properly regarded as discrimination based on
disability.” Id. at 597.
207. See, e.g., Anne K. Pecora, The Constitutional Right to Court-Appointed Adversary
Counsel for Defendants in Guardianship Proceedings, 43 ARK. L. REV. 345, 347–48, 361
(1990) (arguing that due process should accord the appointment of counsel in every
guardianship proceeding).
208. LAUREN BARRITT LISI ET AL., CENTER FOR SOCIAL GERONTOLOGY, NATIONAL
STUDY OF GUARDIANSHIP SYSTEMS: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 648 (1994).
209. Sallyanne Payton, The Concept of the Person in the Parens Patriae Jurisdiction over
Previously Competent Persons, 17 J. MED. & PHIL. 605, 625–26 (1992) (recounting the
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counterpart210 distinguished between the competency and capacity of
persons referred to as “idiots” (those with intellectual or
developmental disabilities) and “lunatics” (those with mental or
psychosocial disabilities). The distinction focused the determination
of capacity on the onset and nature of the medical diagnoses.
Medical experts distinguished between intellectual and developmental
disabilities as congenital and permanent and mental and psychosocial
disabilities as diseases with intermittent periods of lucidity.211 These
medically-based, categorical definitions of capacity became different
standards of proof for constitutional deprivations of liberty (i.e.,
commitment standards).212
Early guardianship procedures were largely informational and
ministerial except in the case of wealthier respondents who could
both pay for a more formal process and, in the eyes of the law,

feudal structure and the sovereign powers of parens patrie over proclaimed lunatics
and mad individuals).
210. After the American Revolution, state legislatures stepped into the role of
parens patriae on behalf of vulnerable populations. Developments in the Law—Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1208 (1974); see Late Corp. of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890)
(“This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every state,
whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the Legislature, and has no
affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible
monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their
liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and often necessary to
be exercised in the interests of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those
who cannot protect themselves.”).
211. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *302, *304; see Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S.
312, 326–28 (1993) (noting that English common law distinguished between “idiots”
and “lunatics” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
212. One example of how the presumptions of incapacity for people with
intellectual or developmental disabilities and the limited capacity of people with
mental or psychosocial disabilities has continued in American jurisprudence is the
difference between the civil commitment standard for people with intellectual
disabilities and the civil commitment standard for people with mental or
psychosocial disabilities—clear and convincing and beyond a reasonable doubt,
respectively. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 314–15, 322 (examining different standards of
review based on the belief that there is a greater risk of error in diagnosing mental
disability than intellectual disability). The Supreme Court has upheld such
distinctions based on a medical model of disability that purports to determine
intellectual functioning based on precise intelligence quotient assessments whereas
no such “objective” standard exists for people with mental or psychosocial disabilities
requiring a higher evidentiary standard for the denial of liberties. But see Hall v.
Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014) (expressing agreement with medical experts
that there is an existence of a range, or standard error of measurement, in
determining intellectual disability).
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warranted additional formality and protections because of the
property at stake. Accordingly, these early proceedings developed
out of the conservatorship side of probate, directly related to the
allocation of property rights and protections. The King and, later,
the state, viewed guardianship over the person as a private matter
best addressed by the incapacitated person’s “committee” or
designated family and friends.213
The Lord Chancellor’s
determination of incapacity (“non compos”) triggered parens patriae
authority of the state.214 The issuance of a writ de lunatico inquirendo—
granting the state conservatorship over his property and friends and
family guardianship over the person—or a writ de idiota inquirendo—
appointing family or friends as guardians over the person and his
property—followed a jury’s fact determination of “idiocy” or
“lunacy.”215 The jury made its determination, however, based solely
on their subjective experiences with the respondents and without
instruction from the Lord Chancellor or the common law.
Guardianship proceedings developed in the United States in line
with the Lord Chancellor’s concern for management of the property
of a person believed to be legally incompetent; the family had
jurisdiction over anyone without a property interest.216 Very early on,
states recognized that the collateral consequences of an adjudicated
label of “incompetence,” such as the loss of liberty and property,
warranted adequate due process protections. But states offered few
guidelines with respect to the degree and nature of due process
requirements. For example, by the turn of the twentieth century in
Maryland, courts recognized that to deprive a person of such
fundamental liberties without a jury trial “under the general
principles of American law, without notice, or opportunity to be
heard, was shocking to one’s sense of justice and unity. No such
general rule of procedure can be recognized by the American

213. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 211, at *305.
214. Id.
215. Id. at *303–05.
216. See Joan L. O’Sullivan & Diane E. Hoffmann, The Guardianship Puzzle:
Whatever Happened to Due Process?, 7 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 11, 16 (1996)
(“Those who lacked both family and wealth, and who were too old or sick to work,
were left to wander the countryside begging for their sustenance, for the state had
little apparent interest in providing for their persons.”).
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courts.”217 Yet such proclamations did not produce formal rules or
jurisprudential standards until the mid-twentieth century.218
Most states had a formal statute in place by the 1950s with
procedural guidelines for the appointment of a conservator of the
property of an “incapacitated person” (defined as a person of
advanced age or a person with an intellectual limitation unable to
care for his property). State or surrogate jurisdiction over the
person, what we now know as “guardianship,” however, applied to
minors but not to people with disabilities, who were still understood
to be wards of their families.219 A state court judge most often
adjudicated these proceedings. Thereafter, a majority of states
merged the statutory definitions and processes for people with
intellectual and mental disabilities and shifted resources to account
for plenary guardianship over people regardless of the property
interest.220 The introduction of the Uniform Probate Code in 1969
also paved the way for more formal procedural protections and
guidelines.221 The deinstitutionalization of people with disabilities in
the 1970s and 1980s (promoted in part by media exposure of
rampant abuse and neglect) also created opportunities for society to
think more critically about conceptions of agency, dignity, and
competence of people with disabilities.222
217. Id. at 17 (quoting Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Nicholson, 65 A.
320, 322 (Md. 1906)).
218. See A. Frank Johns, Guardianship Folly: The Misgovernment of Parens Patriae and
the Forecast of Its Crumbling Linkage to Unprotected Older Americans in the Twenty-first
Century—A March of Folly? Or Just a Mask of Virtual Reality?, 27 STETSON L. REV. 1, 34–
35, 37–38, 46, 60 (1997) (detailing the various changes in law through the
promulgation of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) in 1969, where Article V
discusses guardianship for minors and adults; the enactment of California’s three
guardianship laws in the 1970s; the production of the Uniform Guardianship and
Protective Proceedings Act (UGPPA) in 1982; and the production of the 1993
National Probate Court Standards on Guardianship and Conservatorship).
219. See, e.g., O’Sullivan & Hoffmann, supra note 216, at 19.
220. Johns, supra note 218, at 35.
221. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform and State Laws
and the American Bar Association introduced the UPC in 1969 and revised it in
1990. 15 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 85.13[c] (Michael Allan
Wolf ed., 2014).
222. See Fred Bayles & Scott McCartney, Guardians of the Elderly: An Ailing System
Part II: Many Elderly Never Get Their Day in Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 20, 1987,
11:50 PM), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1987/Guardians-of-the-Elderly-AnAiling-System-Part-II-Many-Elderly-Never-Get-Their-Day-In-Court/id-8ea94c1c992fd97e
7eea7fe72a924f73 (reporting on the results of an Associated Press investigation into
the vague laws of guardianship that found that senior citizens that face guardianship
are often denied their day in court, many senior citizens are not represented by
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Today, the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act
(UGPPA) seeks to unify state guardianship procedures, streamline
questions of jurisdiction and reciprocity, and promote economic
efficiency in state courts.223 The UGPPA calls for open proceedings
across jurisdictions.224 Interestingly, states have adopted model
uniform jurisdictional procedures (where a key question concerns
jurisdiction over property interests across state lines) much more
readily than uniform procedural due process protections.225
Open guardianship proceedings present significant opportunities
for an antistigma agency for three primary reasons. First, questions
of capacity and competence dominate the legal inquiry. Adjudicators
must decide whether a respondent lacks the capacity to make
decisions about her life and care for herself. If she is found lacking
in such capacity, the adjudicator can grant a petitioner plenary or
limited guardianship to execute daily decisions about her finances,
health, and/or daily living in her “best interest.”226 In order to make
more than a subjective judgment on capacity, adjudicators could
delve into the mechanics of decision making, the normative
procedure for making decisions, and the elements of a qualitatively
“good” decision. However, this takes time and resources, two
elements in short supply at the state court level.227
attorneys, and many of the senior citizens’ own attorneys were determining that they
were incompetent without supporting medical evidence).
223. See UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT prefatory note (1997).
224. Id. § 308(a) (“The hearing may be held in a location convenient to the
respondent and may be closed upon the request of the respondent and a showing
of good cause.”).
225. A majority of states (forty) and the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have
enacted the Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act.
Legislative Fact Sheet—Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act,
UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?titl
e=Adult%20Guardianship%20and%20Protective%20Proceedings%20Jurisdiction%2
0Act (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). However, only five states (Alabama, Colorado,
Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Minnesota) and the District of Columbia and the U.S.
Virgin Islands have enacted the UGPPA. Legislative Fact Sheet—Guardianship and
Protective Proceedings Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Guardianship%20and%20Protective%20Proceedings
%20Act (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
226. Pressure by advocates today seeks to move legislators and courts to an
“expressed desires” standard rather than the paternalistic “best interest” standard
that is still operating today as prescribed by statute or, less formally, in practice. See
Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik, Surrogate Decision-Making Standards for
Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1491, 1497–532 (2012).
227. See, e.g., Preliminary COSCA Budget Survey: Summary, A.B.A. (May 2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/task_force/cosca_b
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Second, and relatedly, the respondent (and her lawyer) can play a
critical role in expanding the normative benchmark of decision
making that currently centers on beliefs about autonomy and
individual agency. Most recently, a twenty-nine year old woman with
Down syndrome, Jenny Hatch, won an iconic victory in Virginia in a
guardianship proceeding.228 Hatch’s parents petitioned for plenary
guardianship alleging that, among other concerns, she made poor
decisions about her health, safety, and choice of living arrangements
and that these decisions necessitated more formal intervention.229
Hatch disagreed with her parents’ decision to place her in a group
home after she had lived and worked on her own. The judge, after a
six-day bench trial, ultimately determined that Ms. Hatch would
benefit from court-appointed guardians of her choice for a limited
duration and with a very narrow scope of authority.230 This order has
tremendous expressive and functional value.231 It is the first judicial
order to explicitly direct the parties to implement what is known as
“supported decision making.”232 In this new paradigm of equitable
dgtsrvy_maysummaryv3.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing significant state court budget
shortfalls and the impact of decreasing resources on the administration of justice).
228. See Order at 5–6, Ross v. Hatch, No. CWF120000426P3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2,
2013) (limiting the scope of a guardianship order to a “supportive decision making”
role with a limited term of one year).
229. See Petition for Appointment of Guardians at 3, Ross v. Hatch, No.
CFW120000426-DP (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 8, 2012) (“Recent incidents have demonstrated
decisions and behaviors that are contrary to those that a competent person would
make regarding their own health and safety.”).
230. The guardianship order approaches termination. Ms. Hatch will then have
to decide how to proceed and the level and formality of support she would like—e.g.,
powers of attorney for particular matters such as health or finance, limited
guardianship, or no legal structure. See Order, supra note 228, at 5–6.
231. Id. at 4–6 (internal quotation marks omitted). Interestingly, the judge
garnered Ms. Hatch’s opinion from counsel, other witnesses, and the pleadings in
the case; Ms. Hatch did not take the stand during trial. Id. at 3–4. Perhaps a strategic
litigation choice, one wonders about the expressive (and perhaps even functional)
value lost by not putting Ms. Hatch on the stand.
232. Disability rights advocates tout supported decision making as a viable
alternative to guardianship that respects and maintains the agency and dignity of the
person with a disability. See Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable
Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111, 1154–55, 1157 (2013)
(discussing the goal of supported decision making to improve an individual’s wellbeing and promote his dignity and how this model may possibly be a viable
alternative to guardianship); Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental
Illness—A Legal and Appropriate Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279,
306–07, 312–13 (2011) (exploring the characteristics of supported decision making
and how it would be a significant alternative to guardianship as evidenced by other
governments that have adopted legislation offering supported decision making as an
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relief, the individual with a disability benefits from the advice and
assistance of people—in Ms. Hatch’s case, two existing friends—who
assist the individual in decision making processes but do not
substitute their own judgment for the individual with a disability.233
Third, open proceedings have tremendous social marketing value.
They can generate and publicize alternative narratives of disability
that reflect greater agency and that challenge existing stereotypes of
incapacity and incompetence that underwrite disability stigma.
Virginia’s guardianship statute and regulations do not explicitly
establish a presumption of openness.234 Nevertheless, the public
gallery in Ms. Hatch’s case overflowed each day with media,
advocates, legal monitors, and members of the public.235 Not all
guardianship cases will produce the counter-normative narratives of
Jenny Hatch—that is, the highly functioning person with a
developmental disability—though advocates contend that Ms.
Hatch’s case is hardly an exception.236 Rather, the circulation of
more diverse narratives that reflect a continuum of capacity for both
nondisabled people and people with disabilities begins to chip away
at the blanket presumption of incapacity that underlies disability
stigma. The active participation of mainstream media sources,
including the Washington Post and People Magazine, widely
circulated Ms. Hatch’s story and its position within the ongoing
disability rights movement.237 The Hatch victory also resonates more
broadly as a common rally point and mirror of the lived experiences
of many other people with disabilities who are subject to the same

alternative). Functionally, the judge’s order reflects Jenny’s expressed interests
regarding who she wanted as a guardian and the scope of decisions for which she will
require some assistance.
233. See Order, supra note 228, at 5–6.
234. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2007 (Supp. 2014).
235. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Martinis, Counsel of Record for Jenny Hatch,
Quality Trust for Individuals with Disabilities (Aug. 15, 2014) (on file with author).
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Cathy Free & Nicole Weisensee Egan, Woman with Down Syndrome
Fights for Her Freedom—and Wins, PEOPLE MAG. (Mar. 7, 2014, 3:15 PM),
http://www.people.com/people/article/0,,20794070,00.html (praising the outcome
of the case because it will inspire people with disabilities to choose the future they
want for themselves); Theresa Vargas, Virginia Woman with Down Syndrome Becomes
Hero to the Disabled, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/virginia-woman-with-down-syndrome-becomes-hero-to-the-disabled/2013/08/17/
0da21766-062e-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html (emphasizing how Jenny Hatch
has become a symbol of strength and hope by inspiring other people with disabilities
and changing the view on how society treats people with disabilities).
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presumptions of incompetence and incapacity.238 Since the judicial
order, Ms. Hatch has traveled the country for speaking engagements
and conferences to expand the collective disability rights’ consciousness.
2.

Civil commitment
Although public access to involuntary civil commitment
proceedings varies by jurisdiction, more than a third of all states
maintain a statutory presumption of closure with the right to open by
motion.239 A third of the states have no presumption either way and
place the decision to open or close a particular hearing in the hands
of the respondent or her counsel, which, like guardianship, often
results in de facto closed proceedings.240 The remaining states are
split among three permutations: (1) explicit statutory presumptions
of openness with the right of closure granted to respondents or their
counsel; (2) explicit statutory presumptions of openness and broad
judicial discretion to close proceedings in the best interest of the
respondent; and (3) silent statutes implying open proceedings from
descriptions of other procedural protections read in conjunction with
public access language in state constitutions.241 Several states appear

238. Jenny Hatch: Disabled Young Woman Helps Others Gain Independence (CBS News
television broadcast Nov. 30, 2013), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/
jenny-hatch-disabled-young-woman-helps-others-gain-independence (discussing Jenny
Hatch’s case and how she identifies as a person with a disability).
239. HARRIS, supra note 195. But see 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7304(e)(4) (West 2001)
(stating that the hearing is presumptively public unless it is requested to be private);
Kirk v. Commonwealth, 944 N.E.2d 135, 139 (Mass. 2011) (“Once removed from
traditional physical settings normally associated with courts, participants in many
hearings may be tempted to conduct themselves in a manner [that] is not fully
consistent with the elements of procedural due process” (alteration in original)
(quoting DISTRICT COURT STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL PRACTICE: CIVIL COMMITMENT 2.00
cmt. (Admin. Office of Dist. Court 1979) (amended 2011))); In re Det. of D.F.F., 256
P.3d 357, 363 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) (holding that a lower court’s procedural rule
that presumptively closed civil commitment proceedings violated the presumption of
openness in the state constitution and common law).
240. JASMINE E. HARRIS, STATE-BY-STATE CIVIL COMMITMENT HEARING INFORMATION
(2014) (on file with author) (noting statutory language, for example, in Alaska,
where “respondent has the right . . . to have the hearing open or closed to the public
as [s/he] elects”).
241. Id.; see also ALA. CODE § 222(4) (2006) (“All hearings shall be heard by the
probate judge without a jury and shall be open to the public unless the respondent
or his attorney requests in writing that the hearings be closed to the public.”); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44770 (2002) (“The court may exclude all persons not necessary for the
conduct of the proceedings.”); see also OR. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No court shall be
secret, but justice shall be administered openly and without purchase, completely
and without delay . . . .”).
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to be trending in the direction of presumptive openness. Most
recently, for example, state supreme courts in Washington and
Massachusetts struck down statutory presumptions of closed
proceedings as violative of liberty, accountability, and transparency
interests of the respondent and the public.242
Civil commitment laws243 track two separate sources of state
power:244 parens patriae (acting in the best interest of a person found
incapable of providing for her own well-being) or police powers
(acting in the best interest of the state to protect public safety).245 In
early colonial times, the states used both their police powers and
parens patriae in exercising their discretion to involuntarily detain
people with disabilities (primarily mental, although also inclusive of
242. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. But see People v. Dixon, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 33, 40–41, 43–45 (Ct. App. 2007) (applying the Press-Enterprise II test and
holding that the public does not have a presumptive right of access to civil
commitment proceedings because of the treatment focus and discussion of medical
information but that the legislature could decide differently and provide for
precautions to release confidential information).
243. I limit my discussion here to inpatient civil commitment proceedings. Most
states have a form of less restrictive, supervised outpatient civil commitment, also
called “assisted outpatient treatment” (AOT) or “outpatient commitment.” See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(d) (2012) (providing that a court may order a respondent
to outpatient treatment for a maximum of thirty days if it is a less restrictive
alternative to the inpatient treatment that the respondent qualifies for and the
respondent refused the voluntary treatment through the alternative); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59967(a) (Supp. 2005) (asserting that the court may order outpatient
treatment if inpatient treatment would have also been allowed, if the patient will
likely comply with the outpatient treatment order, and if the patient will not be a
danger to the community). Five states (Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Mexico, and Tennessee) do not provide for AOT.
244. See 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2012) (detailing the process and considerations for the
civil commitment of a sexually dangerous person and the different actions to take to
ensure the person is not sexually dangerous to others); see also United States v. Comstock,
560 U.S. 126, 129 (2010) (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 4248, a federal civil-commitment
provision, authorizes the federal government “to detain a mentally ill, sexually dangerous
federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise be released”).
245. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (explaining how the state
has an interest in providing care to those that cannot care for themselves because
they are emotionally disabled and how the state has authority to protect the public
from the mentally ill that may be dangerous); see also MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN
PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 79 (2000) (establishing that the history of
civil commitment shows that there is a “dual policy” basis of police power
commitments and parens patriae commitments); Stuart A. Anfang & Paul S.
Appelbaum, Civil Commitment—The American Experience, 43 ISR. J. PSYCHIATRY &
RELATED SCI. 209, 210–11 (2006) (addressing the history of the development of
involuntary civil commitment statutes, rules, and due process protections from a
medical perspective).
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intellectual and developmental disabilities).
Over time, states
developed a hybrid, near uniform standard of “dangerous to self or
others” for involuntary civil commitment.246 A rather loose customary
standard—generally, whether a person with a disability could provide
self-care irrespective of whether she threatened public order—gave
law enforcement officials and medical doctors significant discretion
to make civil commitment decisions with no oversight.247 Given the
paucity of hospitals248 and space at almshouses, historically, people
with mental disabilities frequently were committed to jails.249
The creation of asylums, the first public institutions for the “moral
treatment” of people with disabilities, operated without much
oversight until after the Civil War and in many ways institutionalized
the informal practices of earlier years.250 Some states in the post-Civil

246. The primary procedural distinction in civil commitment law between people
with mental and psychosocial disabilities and those with intellectual or
developmental disabilities turns on the evidentiary standard: beyond a reasonable
doubt and clear and convincing evidence, respectively. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S.
312, 324–27 (1993); Addington, 441 U.S. at 423–24 (explaining the function of a
standard of proof to allocate the risk of error and the importance of the final
decision). This difference flows, according to the Supreme Court, from the nature
of the disabilities (congenital versus non-congenital), the degree of invasiveness of
the treatments, the connection to dangerousness and public safety, and the liberty
deprivations faced by the respondent. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575
(1975) (“A finding of ‘mental illness’ alone cannot justify a State’s locking a person
up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement.”);
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (balancing out various judgments for
confinement because “[civil commitment] is . . . a massive curtailment of liberty”).
247. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Mental Health Law: Its History and Its Future, 20
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 599, 599 (1996) (discussing the history of civil
commitment of people with mental illness and how they may be involuntarily
detained even if they posed no danger to public order); see also Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715, 736 (1972) (noting the broad power afforded states to commit those
who are mentally ill). The “in need of care or treatment” standard pre-dated the
move toward dangerous to self/others.
248. Few hospitals existed before the nineteenth century, but “[i]f hospital care
was available, as it was in a handful of major cities, families and physicians generally
decided whether patients should be admitted and when they might be discharged.”
Appelbaum, supra note 247, at 599.
249. See, e.g., Michael Winerip & Michael Schwirtz, Rikers: Where Mental Illness Meets
Brutality in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2014), http://nyti.ms/W2jVRi (“Rikers now has
about as many people with mental illnesses—roughly 4,000 of the 11,000 inmates—as
all [twenty-four] psychiatric hospitals in New York State combined. They make up
nearly [forty] percent of the jail population, up from about [twenty] percent eight
years ago” while nationally, studies show that “correctional facilities now hold
[ninety-five] percent of all institutionalized people with mental illnesses.”).
250. Appelbaum, supra note 247, at 599 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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War years adopted procedural due process protections, such as the
right to an attorney and trial by jury, in response to allegations of
abuse and neglect within asylums.251 The allocation of procedural
safeguards shifted over time to reflect public understanding of
mental disability as a treatable illness that may manifest as behavioral
deviance.252 For example, as recently as 1960, a number of states
based civil commitment solely on a person’s need for care or
treatment with no connection to public safety concerns. Greater
association with medical and rehabilitative treatment generated fewer
due process protections for respondents.253 Much of civil commitment
jurisprudence today interpreting “dangerousness” focuses on a
person’s “danger to self” even when framed as “danger to others.”254
The Supreme Court’s decisions in In re Gault255 and Parham v. J.R.256
bridged the procedural requirements in criminal cases with quasicriminal proceedings such as civil commitment.257 The Court in In re
Gault held that the non-punitive, rehabilitative nature of juvenile
delinquency proceedings—like civil commitment proceedings—did
not demand the same constitutional due process safeguards afforded
criminal defendants subject to the police power of the state.258 A
decade later, in Parham, the Court affirmed its position in In re Gault

251. Id.; see also Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 7
PSYCHIATRY 30, 32 (2010) (explaining why the state removed decision making power
from people who abused civil commitment, such as medical professionals, and
placed such authority in the judges’ hands).
252. Appelbaum, supra note 247, at 599 (explaining how “eras of therapeutic
optimism tended to correspond with relaxed procedures, while more fatalistic
periods witnessed a rise in procedural protections”).
253. PERLIN, supra note 245, at 79 (indicating that only five states based civil
commitment on the dangerousness of the individual).
254. Michael Perlin has written extensively on the ambiguity and elusiveness of the
question of doctrinal interpretation of the “dangerousness” standard, including the
problems created by state court splits and inconsistencies regarding the predicate of
an “overt act” of dangerousness. Id. at 80–83 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also The National Center for State Courts’ Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment, 10
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 409, 415 (1986) (referencing the growth of
civil commitment standards at the state level).
255. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
256. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
257. See id. at 607–13 (rationalizing that requiring a formalized hearing for
commitment of a minor child is unnecessary because it would not necessarily reduce
the risks of error and it may be too intrusive); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 56–57
(determining that issuance of an order of commitment in a juvenile proceeding
requires sworn testimony and an opportunity for cross-examination).
258. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15–16 (explaining the early reformers’ views that a
child should be rehabilitated and not subject to punishment).
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that the Constitution did not require formal procedures in the context
of juveniles involuntarily committed to state psychiatric facilities.259
Some states have a separate involuntary civil commitment or
admission process for people with intellectual and developmental
disabilities. For example, the District of Columbia passed the
Mentally Retarded Citizens Constitutional Rights and Dignity Act in
1978.260 The Act established standards and procedures for voluntary
and involuntary commitments to residential facilities (including
group homes) and outpatient nonresidential habilitation for people
with intellectual and developmental disabilities.261 It provided
specific due process protections for commitments and mandated a
review of voluntariness and competency of individuals to consent to
admissions.262 Section § 7-1304.08 of the Code of the District of
Columbia establishes a presumption of closed proceedings
surmountable only by motion of the respondent or her attorney. As a
practical matter, these proceedings—in an otherwise publicly
available state court—remain presumptively closed to the public.263
Whereas guardianship proceedings concern the curtailment of a
respondent’s decision making autonomy with generally no physical
deprivation of liberty (although the Chenoweth case implicated his
residency in the nursing home),264 civil commitment by definition
addresses the physical liberty of the respondent. Benthamite
publicity concerns and quasi-criminal liberty interests support the use
of open proceedings in the civil commitment context.

259. The Court stated,
Due process has never been thought to require that the neutral and
detached trier of fact be law trained or a judicial or administrative officer. . . .
A state is free to require such a hearing, but due process is not violated by
use of informal, traditional medical investigative techniques. . . . What
process is constitutionally due cannot be divorced from the nature of the
ultimate decision that is being made. Not every determination by state
officers can be made most effectively by use of the procedural tools of
judicial or administrative decisionmaking.
Parham, 442 U.S. at 607–08 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
260. See D.C. CODE § 7301.02(A)(5) (2001) (indicating that one of the purposes of
the Act was to “[m]aximize the assimilation of persons with mental retardation into
the ordinary life of the community in which they live”).
261. Id. § 7303.01–.14.
262. See id. § 7304.01–.13 (discussing procedures and safeguards).
263. I have served as a panel attorney for the District Superior Court’s Mental
Health and Habilitation Branch and have been appointed by the court as counsel or
guardian ad litem in these cases.
264. See supra Part III.B (advancing a new framework—antistigma agency—to
address social stigma).
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With respect to institutional design, reliance on testimony and
recommendations of the treating psychiatrist may have influenced
designers to adopt a setting that looks more like medical reviews than
formal legal hearings on the deprivation of liberty. A medical review
is more akin to a private meeting in a conference room (where these
hearings are often held), in which the reviewer defers to a medical
doctor’s expertise, than to a more formal hearing in court, where the
law and its adjudicators are experts in resolving questions of public
significance.
Civil commitment statutes, even in the case of
presumptive openness, call for informality or flexibility of location
and form for the convenience of the respondent.265
The
“convenience” caveat allows for hearings in psychiatric hospitals,
which lack the visibility, convenience, and public notice to generate
public awareness or attendance, though they are not formally closed
to the public.
One argument against open proceedings in the civil commitment
context is the strength and pervasiveness of the stigma of mental and
psychosocial disability. Stigma, according to this argument, demands
privacy as a means to protect respondents from further
stigmatization. However, this argument suffers from circularity and
may reflect a certain degree of shortsightedness. The argument that
“mental disability is so stigmatized that we need to conceal it” lacks
sophistication and persuasiveness. Social scientists, for example, offer
empirical evidence to the contrary, namely that disclosure of mental
and psychosocial disabilities can be therapeutic and destigmatizing
for the individual and the public.266
E. Administrative Agency Adjudication
Administrative agency proceedings reflect a growing alternative to
court-based adjudication to the dismay of many proceduralists.267
265. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59965(C) (2005) (“All persons not necessary for
the conduct of the proceedings may be excluded. The hearings shall be conducted
in as informal a manner as may be consistent with orderly procedure and in a physical
setting not likely to have a harmful effect on the welfare of the proposed patient.”).
266. See, e.g., Corrigan & Matthews, supra note 150, at 244 (comparing “coming
out” for the LGBT community with public disclosure for people with psychiatric
disorders as it relates to stigma and finding that each process is beneficial for both
individuals and communities).
267. See, e.g., Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra note 1, at 1802 (describing “the
devolution of adjudication to administrative agencies” as a function, at least partly, of
judicially-driven amendments to the federal rules of civil procedure). The Supreme
Court has not addressed whether the public’s constitutional right of access extends
to administrative proceedings. Judge Guido Calabresi, however, writing for the U.S.
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The scholarship reflects an existential struggle with increasing
administrative agency-based adjudication. Some scholars caution
against over relying on less visible forms of adjudication (agency
hearings, arbitration, and mediation), arguing that such proceedings
develop information “in the shadow of constitutional obligations”268
rather than negotiating such information in and with the public.
Other scholars argue that the actual or perceived illegitimacy of
courts may outweigh any procedural or substantive advantages.
Yet disability occupies an interesting position in the broader debate
about administrative adjudication. Disability adjudication regarding
education, economic support (e.g., social security and veterans’
benefits), and employment discrimination (at least in the first
instance) takes place in conference rooms in agency buildings
behind presumptively or effectively closed doors. Furthermore, with
respect to stigma, the current design of certain disability laws makes it
difficult to receive the necessary services (in the case of special
education) or economic support (in the case of social security) unless
the person with a disability meets very restrictive guidelines.
Thus, constructing and advancing a viable legal theory often
requires emphasis on limitations and impairments rather than
framing the inquiry on the support services necessary for the person
to receive an education, live, or work in the most inclusive
environment. My goal in reframing the legal inquiry through the
lens of antistigma agency is to illustrate the potential for redesigning
the guiding legislation as much as the adjudicative procedures. The
remainder of this section focuses on social security and special
education hearings that adjudicate questions of agency and

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, recently extended the presumption of open
proceedings to an administrative process before the New York City Transit Authority
(NYCTA). NYCTA denied the New York Civil Liberties Union access to an
administrative hearing on the basis of procedural rules requiring affirmative consent
from the respondent but also established concurrent jurisdiction for state criminal
courts and NYCTA to adjudicate a traffic violation. N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union v.
N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 293 (2d Cir. 2011). Judge Calabresi, though
leaving open the question of broader applicability to other administrative
proceedings, emphasized that “[t]he public’s right of access to an adjudicatory
proceeding does not depend on which branch of government houses that
proceeding” but, rather, on a balance of the interests at stake. Id. at 290. The
Second Circuit did not address the question of whether the public’s First
Amendment right to presumptive, qualified access extends to administrative
proceedings as a general matter.
268. Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra note 1, at 1821.
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integration, albeit through a slightly different lens, to examine the
root of design choices and their relationship with disability stigma.269
1.

Social Security
Social security appeals hearings involving disability claims are
presumptively closed to the public.270 Procedural design choices
reflect public sentiments regarding the nature of the proceeding. In
this context, social security disability appeals take place in small
conference rooms where, as a practical matter, there is little room for
a gallery. Furthermore, the Social Security Administration’s (SSA)
focus on increasing efficiency (perhaps at the expense of other
underlying procedural values) has produced hearings via
“videoconference” and telephonic cross-examinations of witnesses,271
allowing administrative law judges (ALJs) to hear cases in one
location and permitting the appellant, her attorney, and witnesses
(including the SSA’s vocational expert) to appear in different
locations from the ALJ, and even from each other.272
Yet the Social Security Act provides a disability claimant with the
right to a “full and fair hearing.”273 The ALJ conducts these hearings
in an inquisitorial fashion with the appellant, the ALJ, and any
witnesses present. The inherent informality of the social security
appeals process congressional design positions the ALJ as neither
advocate nor adversary.274

269. Specific redesign proposals fall outside of the scope of this Article.
270. See 20 C.F.R. § 405.320(a) (2014) (“A hearing is open only to you [social
security claimant] and to other persons the administrative law judge considers
necessary and proper.”). But see id. § 498.215(d) (providing that in civil penalty cases
for social security fraud, “[t]he hearing will be open to the public unless otherwise
ordered by the ALJ for good cause”).
271. Hepp v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 798, 805–06 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
disability claimant’s cross-examination of the witness by telephone afforded him
sufficient due process).
272. 20 CFR § 405.350(a) (“[A] right to appear before the administrative law
judge, either in person or, when the administrative law judge determines . . . by video
teleconferencing, to present evidence and to state your position.”).
273. See Northcutt v. Califano, 581 F.2d 164, 167 (8th Cir. 1978) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401–02 (1971)
(holding that procedural due process requires full and fair hearings for disability
claimants challenging agency decision).
274. See, e.g., Richardson, 402 U.S. at 403 (“We bear in mind that the agency
operates essentially, and is intended so to do, as an adjudicator and not as an
advocate or adversary. This is the congressional plan.”).
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In 1935, Congress created the SSA to provide benefits in a manner
that is efficient and effective to the “deserving disabled.”275
Specifically, the Social Security Act covers old age, survivors, and
disability insurance under Title II.276 A decade later, Congress,
responding to the exponential growth of the administrate state,
enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to provide
uniformity and fairness in the administrative process within the
federal government.277 The SSA previously held that the agency was
not subject to the APA hearing requirement; however, the SSA
commissioner, in an attempt to clarify the due process responsibilities
of the agency, released a written statement that reinforced the
applicability of the APA to Social Security Act adjudications.278 The
SSA appears to be in substance and form, an “agency” under § 2(a) of
the APA.279 For example, the SSA appeals hearings reflect statutory
elements of “adjudication” under section 2(a) of the APA such as
examination and cross-examination of witnesses, independence of
adjudicators, and written findings of fact and conclusions of law.280
Congress has a substantial interest in providing a check on the
SSA’s power, particularly given that the number of adjudicative
hearings held each year outpaces those held in federal courts.
Between September 2013 and September 2014, social security ALJs
conducted over 614,500 individual hearings.281 Claimants on average
275. See Kelly Huntley, Issues in the Third Circuit: “To Review or Not To Review?”—
That Is the Question: Interpreting New Evidence in Social Security Disability Claims in the
Third Circuit, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (2002) (stating that Congress passed the
Social Security Amendments of 1980 to strengthen federal management of state
disability determinations and to make the disability insurance program more organized).
276. See Robin J. Arzt, Recommendations for a New Independent Adjudication Agency to
Make the Final Administrative Adjudications of Social Security Act Benefits Claims, 23 J. OF
NATIONAL ASS’N OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES 267, 269–70 (2003) (“The Social Security
Administration . . . sets and implements the policy standards for entitlement to Social
Security Act Title II old age, survivors and disability insurance program benefits . . . .”).
277. Id. at 319 (including uniform standards for conducting adjudicatory proceedings).
278. Id. (arguing that selective applicability threatens claimants’ due process rights).
279. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (defining
“agency” to mean an authority of the U.S., “whether or not it is within or subject to
review by another agency” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
280. Id. § 551(7); see also Arzt, supra note 276, at 320 (emphasizing the importance
that social security hearings are also APA adjudications because 5 U.S.C. § 3105
requires ALJs to preside over the hearings); G. M. Buechlein, What Constitutes
“Adversary Adjudication” by Administrative Agency Entitling Prevailing Party to Award of
Attorneys’ Fees Under Equal Access to Justice Act (5 USCS § 504), 96 A.L.R. FED. 336, 346–48
(1990) (discussing the variation in treatment of social security proceedings on remand).
281. Hearings Held In-Person or Via Video Conferencing Report FY 2014 (For Reporting
Purposes: 09/28/2013 Through 09/26/2014), SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., available at
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waited one year between when they filed the appeal and appeared before
an ALJ and often without receiving income supports and Medicaid or
Medicare benefits that may be linked to social security eligibility.282
Furthermore, plaintiffs filed approximately 20,000 new social
security federal district court appeals (denials of supplemental
security income and disability insurance) in 2013—representing
upwards of seven percent of the total civil cases commenced and a
substantial number of new civil cases entering the system.283
Although situated in presumptively open federal district courts,
federal district or magistrate judges review these cases on the briefs
and the existing factual record to determine whether the ALJ’s decision
was supported by “substantial evidence” without a gallery present.284
Even if the public packed the gallery at the agency or federal court
levels, would an open hearing exacerbate or mediate stigma based on
the Social Security Act’s definition of disability as severely limited and
inability to participate in the workforce? For example, a federal
magistrate judge upon reviewing the SSA hearing record concluded
that a plaintiff was not “disabled” under the Social Security Act and
thus ineligible to receive benefits because she “successfully completed
high school, worked for eleven years, described herself as literate on
a disability report, and was able to read well enough to take and pass
a written driver’s license test.”285 A showing of capacity translates
into a denial of eligibility for income supports. This may suggest
that the narratives of disability created in these proceedings would
undermine agency and dignity. However, greater publicity of the
legal standards for receipt of assistance can also highlight their
counter-effectiveness to the goals of integrated employment.

http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/archive/archive_data_reports.html#a1=5&ht=1
(last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
282. Average Wait Time Until Hearing Held Report (For the Month of December 2014),
SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., available at http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/
01_NetStat_Report.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
283. See U.S. District Courts—Social Security Cases Commenced During the 12Month Period Ending September 30, 2013, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/appendices/C10Sep13.pdf (last visited Mar.
30, 2015). Courts of appeals and district court rules favoring mediation and case
settlement discussions categorically exclude social security. See LAURAL HOOPER ET
AL., FED. JUD. CTR., CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF
APPEALS 16 (2d ed. 2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
caseman2.pdf/$file/caseman2.pdf.
284. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
285. Pelfrey v. Comm’r, No. 1:08CV605, 2010 WL 909134, at *3 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 10, 2010).
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Privacy concerns certainly exist—specifically the abundance of
medical information required to prove disability under the statute
and the potentially disempowering narratives about functional
limitations required to meet the statutory definitions of severity. One
could imagine the social security context as not ideal for the
construction and dissemination of agency enhancing narratives.
However, this is due, at least in part, to the legislative design and,
with greater access, could produce a more informed national
conversation on the role of social supports in the disability context.
At least one social security administrative law judge, president of
the Association of Administrative Law Judges, has called for more
public participation in agency-level appeals hearings (albeit for
different reasons). The ALJ advocates for greater adversarial
structures in appeals hearings to reflect the large dockets, interests at
stake, and to give the public a window into what he describes as a
current imbalance of power.286
2.

Special education
Special education due process hearings, much like social security
appeals, have a split adjudicative personality between formal and
informal.
They are presumptively closed, but the IDEA and
supporting regulations require states to give parents287 the right to
open the proceeding to the public.288 States designed these due
process hearings to be informal, non-adversarial settings for dispute
resolution. For example, hearings are held in small conference
rooms at the local educational agency or state administrative hearings
offices, hearing officers are employees of the local or state
educational agencies (with minimal insulation to protect the
adjudicator’s independence), the rules of evidence do not strictly
apply, and there is no right to appointed counsel. However, these
hearings also reflect elements of more formal court-based
adjudication:
opportunities for discovery (albeit limited) and
disclosure; motion practice; strict statutes of limitations on liability
and damages; the frequent use of expert witnesses; a somewhat

286. See D. Randall Frye, Fixing Disability Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/20/opinion/fixing-disability-courts.html (noting the
recent push by ALJs to bring technology and greater accessibility into the SSA court
room and, thereby, to encourage greater advocacy in a more adversarial process).
287. Or surrogate. I use “parent” as a proxy for “educational rights holder.”
288. 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(c)(2) (2014) (“Parents involved in hearings must be
given the right to . . . [o]pen the hearing to the public . . . .”). This explicit grant of
authority is not enumerated in the IDEA.
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bifurcated presentation of evidence on liability and damages (also
heavily dependent on expert testimony); statutory provision for the
availability of attorneys’ fees; and multitier appellate review289 with
choice of state or federal court upon exhaustion of remedies.
Congress designed special education due process hearings to
protect the special education rights holder290 from arbitrary state
action denying the student with a disability291 a right to a “free [and]
appropriate public education” (FAPE)292 in the “least restrictive
[educational] environment” (LRE)” (or most inclusive setting).293
The IDEA established clear procedural due process protections,
including prior written notice of schools’ decisions to change the
individualized education program, the location of educational services,
and school placement.294
The antistigma values of special education due process hearings
are complicated by potentially conflicting interests of the educational
rights holder (usually the parent) and the student who receives
special education services.
The demonstrative value of the
proceedings may be less for the parent than the student, although,
social science suggests that “courtesy stigma”—the stigma
experienced by family and friends of a person with a disability—can
undermine efforts towards broader societal destigmatization.
Alternatively, a student may wish to conceal a hidden disability as a
means of managing self and public stigma while the parent—the

289. See Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 860–66 (1984) (providing a
useful procedural framework to conceptualize underlying values of procedure—e.g.,
levels of appellate review and values of finality or accuracy—and the trade-offs at work).
290. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2)(A) (2012) (stating that the court may appoint
educational surrogates); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982)
(recognizing a parent’s constitutional rights and requiring “clear and convincing
evidence” to terminate those rights); Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student R.J.,
585 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1211 n.1 (D. Or. 2008) (“[T]he attorney in an IDEA action
usually represents the parents [as educational decisionmakers] . . . .”).
291. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(1), (3)–(6), (8)–(9), (11)–(13) (2003) (explaining that
receipt of special education services requires proof of a qualifying disability that
“adversely affects” education).
292. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Sch. Comm. of
Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 361 (1985) (indicating that 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(a) requires the “provision of free appropriate public education” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
293. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5).
294. See id. § 1400 (setting forth the policy objectives of the IDEA and noting the
many deficiencies that existed prior to its passage); see also id. § 1415(d) (establishing
that school districts have an affirmative duty to provide procedural safeguards to
parents and educational decision makers).
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educational rights holder by statute—may wish to invite members of
the public and press to publicize, educate, or mobilize other families
around a common recurring or widespread harm.
IV. A RESPONSE TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
Understandably, the proposition of presumptively open
proceedings as antistigma agents may raise some concerns. This
project seeks to surface longstanding assumptions about privacy and
disability and propose antistigma agency as a new interpretive and
prescriptive lens for disability adjudication to shift social norms of
disability.
Accordingly, this Article opens the doors of the
proceedings but recognizes the need for procedural redesign once
inside those doors to generate agency-enhancing experiences and
narratives for people with disabilities and the public.
With that in mind, the prescription may still raise concerns about
the proper balance between privacy and confidentiality as well as the
power of disclosure and discussion as affirmative opportunities to
reduce stigma. These questions reflect tensions between short-term
and long-term prescriptions, individual and collective choices, and
limited resource allocation.
I briefly address four potential objections followed by a discussion of
the movement towards greater public access in the context of
another historically private and stigmatized area: family law. While
many of the potential objections to open proceedings apply equally
in those settings, nevertheless, institutional designers have shifted in
favor of greater sunlight for a number of reasons such as greater
transparency and public accountability.
A. Tension with Existing Privacy Laws
Open proceedings do not necessarily conflict with privacy either in
the health law context (e.g., HIPAA), or in the educational context
(e.g., the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)).
Institutional designers are well-acquainted with the construction of
procedural rules that address medical or other “sensitive”
information with varying levels of protection. For example, certain
rules provide for filing specific documents under seal, protective
orders, limited redaction of documents, or truncating parts of
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otherwise open proceedings to present certain arguments and
accompanying evidence in camera.295
B. Exacerbating Stigma
A concern may arise regarding the potential for openness and
publicity to exacerbate stigma based on the often-precarious positions
of the people with disabilities in these proceedings. In this sense,
perhaps, privacy may operate to protect further dissemination of
negative stereotypes and self-stigmatization. Jeffrey Rosen advanced a
similar argument about privacy more broadly in his book, The
Unwanted Gaze. He emphasized the importance of maintaining
“private spaces” to protect people against being judged unfairly out of
context and “mistaking information for knowledge in a culture of
exposure.”296 Rosen raises a valid concern as to whether, if we unlock
the courthouse door or conference room, the types of narratives
produced will reduce or exacerbate disability stigma.
If we opened guardianship hearings tomorrow, for example, would
they produce the desired narratives demonstrative of capacity rather
than demonstrative incapacity that may reinforce existing stigma?
Jerry Chenoweth’s guardianship proceedings were open, yet they did
not generate the narratives of agency that would be useful in
reducing stigma—partly because the court proceeded without
Chenoweth present, thus undermining opportunities for his own
destigmatization process (defending his case), and because the media
and potential public observers who could reproduce his narrative
were absent from the gallery.
In isolation, without more, open proceedings cannot be expected
to produce the quality of information required to challenge existing
biases. However, this is not a reason to neglect the potential benefits
of open proceedings in combination with broader procedural
reforms. Jenny Hatch’s case supports this point. But what other
factors were at play? Open proceedings offered a public space for
Hatch’s and the public’s destigmatization of disability. Hatch, her
lawyers, and the media created a perfect storm to shift the public
295. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2635(b)(2)–(c) (allowing for a court to review confidential
evidence in camera); FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a)(1)–(4), (d)–(f), (h). This raises a question
about the fiscal, human, and other costs associated with opening adjudication in the
disability context, which will be discussed in a later project.
296. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 223 (2001). Erving Goffman expressed a similar view of privacy as a means
of resisting and managing public stigma. GOFFMAN, supra note 139, at 91–95
(discussing methods of information control and its relationship to personal identity).
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consciousness and advance Hatch’s own connection to broader
collective action. Hatch’s case also presented great facts to make a
point about presumptions of incapacity.
While Jenny Hatch’s case may present a high degree of antistigma
agency such that it falls closer to the end of the continuum of open
proceedings without qualification, there may be others for whom
openness at that level would, on balance, exacerbate existing stigma
and/or do little to enhance the person’s overall agency. However,
questions of openness should not turn on the quality of the
narratives such that only narratives similar to Jenny Hatch’s
circulate in public spaces.
Social science reveals that, given society’s high degree of cognitive
dissonance, the selective presentation of disconfirming evidence that
runs opposed to a stereotype may be cognitively discounted by the
public.297 Furthermore, with respect to confirmation bias, empirical
studies indicate that the best chance of disconfirming bias is in the
production of moderately disconfirming information.298 Disability
adjudication may generate a mixture of narratives on a spectrum
between maximum functional capacity and severe functional
limitations. Social science supports the potential of the grey zone to
avoid cognitive discounting.299
A related question might ask whether procedural design is the best
vehicle for reducing stigma. As discussed previously, empirical
contact between the nondisabled and people with disabilities appears
to offer the most potential for stigma reduction. However, legislated
forms of contact—employment (ADA) and education (IDEA), for
example—have not produced the anticipated opportunities for
integration. While resources must continue to fuel expanded
opportunities for integrated employment and inclusive education,
the ubiquity of stigma requires additional public responses.
Adjudication reflects a hybrid remedy supported by empirical data:
education plus contact. The structures of rules and procedures—
when well designed to reflect underlying values of agency and
dignity—become social marketing platforms for disability.

297. Christina Schwind et al., Preference-Inconsistent Recommendations: An Effective
Approach for Reducing Confirmation Bias and Stimulating Divergent Thinking?, 58
COMPUTERS & EDUC. 787, 788 (2012).
298. Id. at 787–88 (“Since preference consistent information appears convincing
by itself, individuals do not feel any need for justification. In contrast, preference
inconsistent information appears less valid, and this leads to a deliberate search for
further information to refute dissenting arguments.” (citations omitted)).
299. Id. at 794–95.
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C. The Burden of Disclosure
Does this place a greater burden on people with disabilities to
disclose when they already have so little privacy? This objection raises
a familiar tension in social justice movements between the interests of
the individual versus the collective good.300 This tension is particularly
salient in the context of people with disabilities whose lives are highly
regulated by the state. Disability advocates have increasingly called
for greater visibility as a resistance strategy and direct response to a
history of forced invisibility. In fact, disability studies scholars have
identified open discussions about disability by and with people with
disabilities as a central requirement of collective action.301 Much like
in the case of second wave feminists, the disability rights community has
recognized the “personal is political,” which challenges the historical
dichotomy between “public” and “private” spaces.302
D. Populating the Galleries
The success of open proceedings as antistigma agents does not
depend solely on the public populating the galleries at these
proceedings. Open proceedings operate as antistigma agents on
several levels.
First, flipping the presumption in disability
adjudication has a significant expressive value. It sends a powerful
social message that disability is not shameful or in need of protection.
This is the beginning step in determining what type of procedures
might best enhance agency while being consistent with the
substantive laws.
Second, open proceedings offer the target
opportunities to resist the effects of stigma through active
participation in the creation and dissemination of her lived

300. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Shape Stops Story, 15 NARRATIVE 124, 129–30
(2007) (discussing the tension from a lawyering perspective of resisting the state’s
overly burdensome requests for the details of the lives of marginalized people in
litigation versus the strategic use of those spaces to expand the power of narratives).
301. See, e.g., Corbett Joan O’Toole, Disclosing Our Relationships to Disabilities: An
Invitation for Disability Studies Scholars, 33 DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2013) (“I want to talk
about why we . . . don’t talk about our relationships to disabilities. . . . [W]e skirt
around it. We whisper the information to each other over coffee. But there are no
standardized signifiers of our relationships to disabilities, no universal expectation
of public disclosure, no support when people ask for public disclosure. In fact, it’s
just the opposite.”).
302. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 111 (1989) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality
and Law: New Issues and Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 97, 114 (1994)
(“This type of analysis [(the personal is the political)] can be applied to the study of
disability almost without modification.”).
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experience. Even if her story is told through counsel, rules of ethics
(particularly Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14)303 call for her
control over the content of the narrative conveyed. Third, the design
choice of open court proceedings includes access to the records in
those cases. Public access can create a body of jurisprudence in this
area to guide the behavior and expectations of legal actors. It can
also provide opportunities for data collection and analysis by researchers
such as the National Center for State Courts.
E. Unveiling Family Law
Other areas of family law previously closed to the public, for many
of the same reasons driving closure in the disability arena (e.g., the
“best interests” of the child) have flipped former presumptions in
favor of qualified openness. States have articulated a variety of legal
sources regarding public access, including state constitutions, statutes,
regulations, court rules, case law, or some combination thereof. For
example, Oregon’s constitution explicitly states that “[n]o court shall
be secret, but justice shall be administered, openly and without
purchase . . . .”304 In contrast, North Carolina has no formally
articulated procedural directive and, instead, has relied on judicial
discretion and practice to treat these proceedings as presumptively
open with judicial discretion to close.305
Much of the resistance to public access to these proceedings is a
function of attitudes about the shame and fears that drive people
to closet issues in the name of privacy, convenience, and

303. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (2014) (“[T]he lawyer shall,
as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the
client.”); see also id. R. 1.14 cmt. 1 (“The normal client-lawyer relationship is based on
the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of
making decisions about important matters.”).
304. OR. CONST. art. I, § 10.
305. BARTON CHILD LAW & POLICY CLINIC, EMORY UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, OPEN OR CLOSED:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT OPINIONS AND REALITIES OF OPENING JUVENILE COURT
DEPRIVATION PROCEEDINGS 7 (3rd ed. 2006), available at http://bartoncenter.net/
uploads/fall2011updates/policy_general/OpenCourtsMemo.pdf [hereinafter BARTON
CENTER REPORT]; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-801 (2011) (providing judicial discretion to
close parts of proceedings in juvenile cases). The General Statutes of North Carolina
suggest that judges assess the following factors when determining whether to close
parts of a hearing in the child welfare context: an examination of the nature of the
allegations against the parent or guardian, the age and maturity level of the young
person, the benefits of confidentiality and openness to the young person, and the
potential harm to the young person’s confidentiality over time if opened now. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7B-801(a).
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protection.306 The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges, a group of adjudicators in family and juvenile matters
including judges, referees, and masters, passed a resolution in
support of opening (with judicial discretion to close) all juvenile
proceedings, including delinquency, abuse, and neglect.307 The
resolution explained the need to open proceedings to advance
institutional accountability, efficacy, public education, and confidence.308
Even in child welfare proceedings, where the interest in protecting
the child’s privacy is significant, states increasingly are moving to
open access to promote transparency and public accountability.
Congress has expressly clarified that no federal grant requirement
prevents states from opening proceedings to the extent that they do
not endanger the safety and wellbeing of the young person.309
Accordingly, about one-third of states have moved to presumptively
open child protection proceedings.310
The movement in this area began in the 1990s with a handful of
state pilot projects to test the impact of public access on a child’s
psychological state. The central concern was that public access and
dissemination of the child’s story—through the media or by word of
mouth—would lead to repeat trauma for the young person.311

306. See, e.g., BARTON CENTER REPORT, supra note 305, at 2 (“The majority of
arguments advanced on either side are not legal arguments per se; rather they are
predominately the opinions of care givers, court personnel and child advocates on
how the system works or can be mended.”).
307. See Resolution No. 9: Resolution in Support of Presumptively Open Hearings with
Discretion of Courts to Close, NAT’L COUNCIL JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES (July 20, 2005),
available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/resolution%2520no.%25209%2520
open%2520hearings.pdf (resolving that the public has an interest the legal holdings of
the family courts in dealing with complicated issues of juvenile justice and child protection).
308. Id. (lacking procedural recommendations on how to close proceedings (e.g.,
by motion) or the applicable evidentiary standard (e.g., compelling government interest)).
309. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (2012) (proclaiming that federal grants to state child
protection services shall not preclude a state’s discretion on how it procedurally
conducts family court adjudications).
310. BARTON CENTER REPORT, supra note 305, at 6 n.21 (“The states with
presumably open proceedings and judicial discretion to close are Arizona, Colorado,
Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada,
New York, North Carolina, Texas, Utah and Washington.”). Oregon does not specify
a presumption of openness in juvenile proceedings because its constitution provides
a presumption of openness in all courts. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 10; State ex rel.
Oregonian Publ’g Co. v. Deiz, 613 P.2d 23, 23, 27 (Or. 1980) (holding that a judge’s
order barring a newspaper publisher and reporter from the hearings of a juvenile
court was invalid under Article I, § 10 of the Oregon Constitution).
311. William Wesley Patton, Bringing Facts into Fiction: The First “Data-Based”
Accountability Analysis of the Differences Between Presumptively Open, Discretionarily Open,
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Minnesota, Arizona, and Connecticut created pilot projects to test the
benefits and risks of open dependency proceedings.312
State
assessments reported success in greater public and media
engagement and have discovered ways to mitigate many of the
potential harms by sealing particularly sensitive records and
restricting the conditions of access where the privacy interests are
particularly significant, such as in the case of rape and incest.
Minnesota has revised its procedures to provide a clear directive that
juvenile protection hearings are presumed open to the public with
discretion of the courts to close.313 As of 2004, about a quarter of
states had advanced the presumption of openness through statutes,
and a handful of states in which hearings were presumptively closed
had initiated pilot projects to study the impact of openness.314
CONCLUSION
New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed a bill, the first of its
kind, in July 2014 requiring the replacement of the “handicapped”
sign with a more active image of a wheelchair user in motion.315
Cuomo, in response to objections regarding significant costs for what
opponents characterized as aesthetic adjustments, argued that the

and Closed Child-Dependency-Court Systems, 44 U. MEM. L. REV. 831, 832–33 (2014)
(summarizing the results of an empirical study on the psychological health of youth
who are subject to open proceedings).
312. See JUVENILE ACCESS PILOT PROGRAM ADVISORY BD., REPORT TO THE
CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY 4 (2010) (reporting on the implementation of a
state pilot program to increase access to juvenile court proceedings); see also Heidi S.
Schellhas, Open Child Protection Proceedings in Minnesota, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 631,
657–66 (2000) (discussing the history of Minnesota’s open juvenile protection
proceedings pilot project, its initially hostile reception, and the need for continued
openness). But cf. Patton, supra note 311, at 867–68 (concluding and reporting that,
empirically, children were more psychologically healthy if they participated in closed
proceedings than in open proceedings).
313. MINN. R. JUV. PROT. P. 8.02 (2009) (enumerating pilot jurisdictions for
open proceedings).
314. Memorandum from Michele Garcia and Charisa Smith to Judge Michael
Mack 1 (Nov. 8, 2004), available at http://www.ctvoices.org/sites/default/files/
welf04courtmemo11.pdf.
315. See H.R. A09934A, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2014) (“AN ACT to
amend the executive law and the vehicle and traffic law, in relation to certain signs
relating to accessibility and related rules and regulations . . . .”).
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“bill is an important step toward correcting society’s understanding of
accessibility and eliminating a stigma.”316
Similarly, this Article seeks to shift the images and narratives of
disability. The law has a complicated history with disability—
rendering disability invisible at one time, allowing for selective
visibility at another, and moving towards full socio-economic visibility
at the present. The ADA has opened the closet of disability but has
been less effective in addressing the barriers associated with disability
stigma that prevent people with disabilities from fully coming out.317
In other words, integration means not only visibility but active
engagement in socio-economic life.
Critical analysis of institutional designs reveals the ways in which
procedures may have perpetuated invisibility and stigma. For
example, the presumptions of private adjudication in the disability
context (either by design or in practice) continue to propagate the
notion of disability as special, personal, and shameful. Procedural
design also reveals untapped potential for mitigating both individual
and societal stigmas of disability—most fundamentally through open
dialogic spaces for the construction and dissemination of counternormative narratives of disability.
The twenty-fifth anniversary of the ADA offers an occasion to
reflect. Scholars and institutional designers have an opportunity to
pivot from a retrospective analysis of disability law to a prospective
one in which procedural design adopts a more active, mitigating role
in the antistigma process. Perhaps New York, once again a
trendsetter, provides a useful image of the next iteration of disability
consciousness—active, progressive, and worth every penny.

316. Press Release, Governor’s Press Office, Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation
Updating New York’s Accessibility Signage and Logos (July 25, 2014), available at
http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/07252014-accessibiliy-signage-and-logos.
317. The “closet” metaphor taken literally and true to its origins in the gay rights
context would suggest its limits to the experience of those with less visible or
“hidden” disabilities—i.e., those with an actual choice of whether to disclose, “cover,”
or “pass.” Yet social scientists have recently expanded this concept through research
in the context of obesity, a visible and highly stigmatizing mark. “Coming out” in this
context reflects the target’s acceptance and “flaunting” of a particularly disfavored
body image. See, e.g., Abigail C. Saguy & Anna Ward, Coming Out as Fat: Rethinking
Stigma, 74 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 53, 54, 57 (2011).

